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"Killing a man is murder unless you do it to the sound of trumpets."
Voltaire
I. INTRODUCTION
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 rekindled a smoldering debate
over the legality of state-sponsored assassination. Many thought that the
casualties inevitable in a massive land assault on Iraqi forces could easily be
avoided by simply killing Saddam Hussein. Indeed, air strikes targeting1
Saddam's command centers were often characterized as an effort to eliminate
1. In military parlance, a "target" is a specific object of attack, and "targeting" involves directing
operations toward the attack of a target. This article uses these terms in the context of assassination.
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the Iraqi leader. However, when the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael
Dugan, suggested that the death of Saddam Hussein might be a coalition
objective, he was quickly dismissed.2
Surely few would argue that state-sponsored assassination is, or should be,
legal. Yet at the same time the use of force in international relations, often
taking the form of intentionally killing one's enemies, has been justified
throughout history.' What is it, then, that distinguishes assassination from
lawful combat, or even from unlawful murder not amounting to assassination?
If assassination is, as will be discussed below, a violation of U.S. and
international law, and one for which both states and individuals may be held
responsible, the term must be defined as clearly as possible to secure compli-
ance. The imposition of responsibility in the absence of notice, even construc-
tive notice, violates one of the most basic principle of law-nullum crimen sine
lege.
Although none of the domestic or international instruments proscribing
assassination actually defines the prohibited conduct, scholars and practitioners
have struggled to craft a working definition to serve as a guide to states in
fashioning their behavior, and also as a prescriptive norm against which other
states could judge and possibly sanction that behavior.' Some scholars focus
on the killing of internationally protected persons or high-level political
figures.' Others ignore the victim's status and instead focus on the purpose of
the act and the presence of any political motivations.6 Still others tend to
2. Eric Schmitt, Confrontation in the Guf; Air Force Chief Is Dismissed for Remarks on Gulf Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1990, at Al.
3. Unilateral resort to force was not considered a violation of customary international law until after
World War II. For a discussion of the effect of the United Nations Charter on customary norms governing
the use of force, see W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and SelfDetermintion: Construing Charter Article
2(4), 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984).
4. The problem arises in part from the fact that the United States prohibition is contained in an
executive order, see infra notes 189, 232, 230-232, rather than in legislation. The order does not include
a section on definitions ordinarily found in statutes. For a general discussion on assassination and the
problems relating to its definition, see MURRAY C. HAVENS ET AL., ASSASSINATION AND TERRORISM:
THEIR MODERN DIMENsIONS 1-20 (1975). A sampling of working definitions of assassination is found in
W. Hays Parks, Memorandum ofLaw: Executive Order 12333 andAssassination, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989,
at 8 app. A.
5. See, e.g., David Newman & Tyll Van Geel, Executive Order 12,333: The Risks of a Clear
Declaration of Intent, 12 HAv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 433, 434 (1989) ("[A]ssassination refers to the
intentional killing of a high level political figure, whether in power or not. The assassination must, for our
purposes, be authorized or condoned by a responsible official of a sovereign state as an intentional state
action expected to influence the policies of another nation."); Bert Brandenberg, Note, The Legality of
Assassination as an Aspect of Foreign Policy, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 655, 655 n.1 (1987) (defining assassina-
tion as "intentional killing of an internationally protected person" and using definition of 'protected person"
from Article 1 of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, art. 1, para. 1, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167 [hereinafter New York Convention]).
6. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 4, at 4 (defining assassination as "the murder of a targeted individual
for political purposes'); Abraham D. Sofher, Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 126 ML.
L. REV. 89, 117 (1989) (defining assassination as "any unlawful killing of particular individuals for political
purposes'). Parks notes that the relevant criterion is not whether the target is politically prominent or
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analogize assassination to the classic law-of-war prohibition on treacherously
killing one's enemy.'
Although each approach has merits, attempts to grapple with the issue of
state-sponsored assassination have been methodologically flawed. These
proposals rely upon a definition of assassination without articulating how that
definition expresses the current legal understanding.' The proposals then use
these arbitrarily derived standards to judge specific types of operations. Since
the ultimate validity of conclusions depends on the accuracy of the chosen legal
norm, the approaches are of limited prescriptive value. It is impossible to
accept conclusions relating to assassination with any confidence in the absence
of certainty over the definition's accuracy.
Assassination must be addressed in terms of definition and context. This
approach searches for the meaning of the prohibition before attempting to judge
any infractions of it, rather than analyzing specific activities under untested
definitions. Prescriptions are dynamic in character: acts that constituted
assassination when a particular normative prescription initially was set forth
may not be so at a later date. If the ultimate goal of international law is world
order, we should not view law as captured by the past. Instead, law must be
understood in a fashion that best enables it to contribute to world order given
the current state of affairs. 9
This article primarily seeks to offer a definitional framework for analyzing
situations implicating the assassination prohibitions. In light of past misuse of
the term, this article seeks to define "assassination" within the narrow limits
of current legal norms to maximize the utility of proscriptions on the act.
serving in a public office. He argues that private individuals who are killed for political reasons are also
victims of assassination. His use of the term "targeted" is instructive. The term imposes a requirement that
the perpetrators plan to kill a particular individual because his death will yield desired political results.
Thus, for Parks, the 1978 murder of defector Georgi Markov in London by Bulgarian State Security agents
using a poison-tipped umbrella met the criterion, whereas the murder of Leon Klinghoffer by Abu el Abbas
in 1985 aboard the Achille Lauro did not. Parks, supra note 4, at 4. Similarly, Judge Sofaer notes that
absent a political purpose, a wrongful killing might be murder, but it would not constitute assassination.
Sofner, supra, at 117.
7. Professor Boyle of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign notes that the United States
executive order banning assassination is based on Article 23(b) of Hague IV which forbids treacherously
killing or wounding the enemy. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV]; Francis A. Boyle, Wat's Still Wrong With PoliticalAssassina-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, at A26; see also infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. Boyle's
assertion is not entirely accurate, however, since the executiveban covers situations short of armed conflict,
whereas Hague IV does not. Instead, the ban is a response to revelations of CIA assassination plots in
peacetime. Thus, Boyle is only partially correct in asserting that despite the executive order, assassination
would be prohibited by Hague IV, which he correctly notes was deemed customary law by the Nuremberg
Tribunal. Boyle, supra, at A26. In the absence of the executiveban, a peacetime assassination might violate
international law, but it would not violate Hague IV.
8. See, e.g., Brandenberg, supra note 5, at 655 n.1; Newman & Van Geel, supra note 5, at 434.
9. A classic example of this view of law in American jurisprudence is the expansive use of the
Commerce Clause to foster civil rights during the era of the Warren Court.
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In the process of developing the framework, Parts 1-V assess the definition
of assassination under international law, placing particular emphasis on the law
of armed conflict.10 Part VI then considers the more controversial issue of
limits under U.S. law, reviewing attitudes and practices since the domestic ban
was first promulgated in 1976 to establish a workable contemporary frame-
work. Part VH draws tentative conclusions that should enable policymakers
or legal advisers to better address, within the confines of international and
domestic law, events that threaten world order.
In addition to providing a definitional framework, this article also seeks
to consider assassination contextually, through an analysis of policy goals at
both the domestic and international level. In this respect, this study attempts
to provide more than a simple catalogue of textual prohibitions. It will consider
broader policy objectives underlying this particular use of force.
Finally, this article considers assassination of individuals from the perspec-
tive of international legal remedies. The study will conclude with a survey of
practical factors likely to affect decisions about targeting, an evaluation of
current bans, and brief recommendations for future prohibitions.
H. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDINGS
The propriety and means of killing one's enemy have been the topic of
scholarly reflection for centuries. Scholars and historical writers thus provide
the foundation upon which contemporary prohibitions are based. Indeed, while
modern attitudes toward assassination reflect a degree of non-European influ-
ence, present prescriptions trace their lineage primarily to Western roots. A
proper understanding of present prohibitions of assassination requires a recog-
nition that these prohibitions are the product of long and systematic refinement
of the rules governing the use of force.
Assassination, or at least killing outside the context of organized warfare,
is not an exclusively modern phenomenon. The Greeks knew assassination,
as did the Romans. It is described in the Bible, and it was a common practice
during the Middle Ages. Assassination has been employed in the service of
both church and state; it played a role in the First World War; and it remains
a prevalent device in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives."
Understanding the heritage of modern views on assassination compels
recognition of the narrow approach taken by early thinkers. Writing in the
thirteenth century, Saint Thomas Aquinas reputedly contended that killing the
sovereign for the common good was legally justified and, in some cases, even
10. This article uses the phrases "law of war" and "law of armed conflict" interchangeably.
11. See generally FRANKLN L. FORD, POLmICAL MURDER: FROM TYRANNIcIDE TO TERRORISM
(1985) (including historical analysis of assassination).
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noble.12 Sir Thomas More similarly proclaimed that in warfare "great re-
wards" awaited those who killed "the enemy prince,"'3 while Alberico
Gentili, the renowned Italian thinker, cited with approval the famous instance
where Pepin, the father of Charlemagne, crossed the Rhine to slay his sleeping
enemy. For Gentili it made "no difference at all whether you kill an enemy
on the field of battle or in his camp." 4 Likewise, Hugo Grotius, also citing
the case of Pepin, noted:
Not merely by the law of nature but also by the law of nations.. it is in fact
permissible to kill an enemy in any place whatsoever; and it does not matter how
many there are that do the deed, or who suffer.
... According to the law of nations not only those who do such deeds, but
also others who instigate others who do them, are considered free from blame.' 5
As these cases illustrate, the means of warfare were not limited to traditional
combat. Nevertheless, specifically targeting one's enemy was not an unre-
stricted right. Most scholarly writings on the subject discussed it solely in the
context of armed conflict. The extension of these standards to peacetime
activities would disregard the basic fact that killing is a primary component
of warfare, as the use of deadly force in peacetime can be justified only in
exceptional cases. Thus, while helpful in understanding the law of war, the
application of these historical views to peacetime relations must be evaluated
critically.
Targeting specific individuals during wartime generally was considered
valid, yet the permissible means were not viewed as unlimited.16 Although
Ayala commended Saint Augustine's opinion that it "is indifferent from the
standpoint of justice whether trickery be used" in assassinating the enemy,17
he was quick to distinguish trickery from "fraud and snares.' This exception
survives in present legal codes as the ruse-perfidy distinction. 9
Gentili similarly denounced "treachery," taking issue with Sir Thomas
More's utility-based standard both on moral and practical grounds. He con-
12. Newman & Van Geel, supra note 5, at 436.
13. THOMAs MORE, UTOPIA 109 (J. Churton Collins ed., Oxford U. Press 1904) (1516).
14. ALEERICO GENTILI, DE luRE BELLI Lmxi TRES (The Classics of International Law No. 16) 168
(John C. Rolfe trans., 1933) (1612).
15. 3 HUGO GRoTIus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1625), quoted in 1 Tim LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 16, 39 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
16. This was the case for a majority of scholars. Conversely, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, writing
in the eighteenth century, argued that 'everything is lawful against an enemy," although he qualified the
statement by noting that perfidy was an exception to the general rule. CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAR 2-3 (Peter S. Du Ponceau ed., 1810) (1737).
17. BALTHAZAR AYALA, THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF WAR AND ON THE DUTIES CONNECTED wrrH
WAR AND ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE 84 (John P. Bate trans., Carnegie Institution 1912) (1582).
18. Id. at 87.
19. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP 9/FMFM 1-10), §§ 12.1 to 12.4 (1989) [hereinafter NAVY
MANUAL]; DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAw-THE CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS (AFP
110-31), 8-4 (1976) [hereinafter AIR FORCE MANUAL]; DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE (FM 27-10), arts. 50-55 (1956) [hereinafter ARMY MANUAL].
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demned More's assertion that by employing assassination the death of innocents
could be avoided while only the guilty would be punished. Gentili labeled the
argument "shameful" and decried its failure to consider "justice or honour."'
Gentili further observed that the use of treacherous assassination failed More's
own test. In a line of reasoning that pervades the current debate, he argued:
But even what he sets forth about utility is uncertain; for will there be no successor
to the deceased prince? Will not his citizens throw themselves into war with the
more energy because of that new wrong, signal and shameful as it is? We shall hear
that soldiers are roused to frenzy when their leader is slain by no legitimate
means. 21
Gentili went on to label treachery "so contrary to the law of God and of
Nature, that although I may kill a man, I may not do so by treachery."' He
also warned that treacherous killing invites reprisal, as rulers who engage in
assassination operations often become targets themselves.'
Gentili's emphasis on treachery as the distinguishing factor between lawful
and unlawful wartime killing is the essence of his contribution. Under Gentili's
model, treachery is the violation of the trust a victim rightfully expects from
an assassin. Accordingly, Pepin's act of sneaking into his enemy's tent was
not unlawful, since the victim had no reason to trust Pepin.24 By contrast,
an equivalent act by a member of the victim's household would constitute
unlawful assassination.' Anyone encouraging a treacherous killing would
similarly be held responsible.'
Writing in the same period, Hugo Grotius echoed Gentili's views on
treachery:
In general a distinction must be made between assassins who violate an express or
tacit obligation of good faith, as subjects resorting to violence against a king, vassals
against a lord, soldiers against him whom they serve, those also who have been
received as suppliants or strangers or deserters, against those who have received
them; and such as are held by no bond of good faith.27
20. GENTIL, supra note 14, at 167.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 168.
23. We ought to think, not what we should wish to happen to the enemy, but what we should
have to fear in such a case .... This maxim is the true foundation of justice, which will not
do to others what it would not wish to be done to itself, and will not refuse to others what it
would wish to have done to itself, as Saint Bernard well puts it.
Id. at 169.
24. So Pepin, father of Charles the Great, having crossed the Rhine attended by a single com-
panion, slew his enemy in bed. You will perhaps find nothing to censure in this save the
recklessness of the deed, which has nothing to do with the rights of the enemy. It makes no
difference at all whether you kill an enemy on the field of battle or in his camp.
Id. at 168.
25. "For whose life can be safe, if it shall be necessary to fear plots even from one's own household?"
Id.
26. Id.
27. GROTIUS, supra note 15, at 38-39.
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As with Gentili, treachery for Grotius meant a breach of confidence, something
he deemed inconsistent with the law of nations and of nature. Grotius recog-
nized, however, that not all treachery was prohibited by the law of nations.
He distinguished treacherous killing by pointing out its potential for encourag-
ing reprisals. All treachery may be sinful, but treacherous killing severely
disrupts what little order exists in war.28
The Swiss scholar Emmerich de Vattel advanced identical principles a
century later. He specifically defined assassination as "a murder committed
by means of treachery,"29 describing it like Grotius and Gentili as a breach
of confidence. Vattel ridiculed any suggestion that the manner in which an
enemy was killed was irrelevant simply because killing is justified in times of
war. Describing this view as "[s]trange principles, fortunately condemned by
even the vaguest ideas of honor," he accurately observed that the violation of
a right by another does not render irrelevant the enforcement of that right."
Perhaps Vattel's mostimportant contribution to understanding assassination
was his emphasis on the principle of necessity. Although he recognized a right
to kill without treachery an enemy leader, Vattel argued that this right vests
only when lesser measures do not suffice. He found both the scale of the
conflict and the state interests in killing an enemy official critical in assessing
this balance. Vattel could not countenance the killing of an enemy sovereign
absent violent conflict and a state threat; in such circumstances, "to take away
the life of the sovereign of the hostile Nation, when it could be spared, would
be to do a greater injury to that Nation than is, perhaps, necessary for the
successful settlement of the dispute."s'
28. Id. at 39-40.
29. But in order to reason clearly on this question we must first of all avoid confusing assassina-
tion with surprises, which are, doubtless, perfectly lawful in warfare. When a resolute soldier
steals into the enemy's camp at night and makes his way to the general's tent and stabs him, he
does nothing contrary to the natural laws of war, nothing, indeed, but what is commendable in
a just and necessary war.... If anyone has absolutely condemned such bold strokes it was only
done with the object of flattering those in high position who would wish to leave to soldiers and
subordinates all the danger of the war.
. Hence I mean by assassination a murder committed by means of treachery, whether
the deed be done by persons who are subjects of him who is assassinated, or of his sovereign,
and who are therefore traitors, or whether it be done by any other agent who makes his way in
as a suppliant or refugee, or as a turncoat, or even as an alien; and I assert that the deed is a
shameful and revolting one, both on the part of him who executes and of him who commands
it.
2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW § 155, at 287-88
(Charles Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution 1916) (1758).
30. Id. at 287.
31. In former times he who succeeded in killing the King or general of the enemy was commend-
ed and rewarded; we know the honors attending the spolia opima. Nothing could have been more
natural than such an attitude; for the ancients almost always fought for the very existence of the
State, and frequently the death of the leader put an end to the war. At the present day a soldier
would not dare, ordinarily at least, to boast of having killed the enemy's King. It is thus tacitly
agreed among sovereigns that their persons shall be held sacred. It must be admitted that where
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Three points critical to understanding current prescriptions of assassination
emerge from this brief historical review.32 First, scholars appear to have
placed no absolute prohibition on seeking the death of one's enemy by uncon-
ventional means. Therefore, to the extent that nineteenth- and twentieth-century
norms limit assassination, they should be understood not as illustrations of a
broader prohibition, but rather as exceptions to the legitimate wartime practice
of selecting specific enemy targets. Thus, analysis of the legality of a killing
operates under a presumptively narrow definition of assassination unless clear
evidence suggests contrary intent.
Second, the term "treachery," a critical component in the current law of
armed conflict, is designed as a breach of confidence by an assailant. Howev-
er, one must be careful not to define treacherous acts too broadly. Use of
stealth or trickery, for instance, is not precluded, and will not render an
otherwise lawful killing an assassination. Treachery exists only if the victim
possessed an affirmative reason to trust the assailant. Thinking in terms of
ruses and perfidy is useful in understanding this distinction: ruses are planned
to mislead the enemy, for example, by causing him to become reckless or
choose a particular course of action. By contrast, perfidy involves an act
designed to convince the enemy that the actor is entitled to protected status
under the law of war, with the intent of betraying this confidence.33 Treach-
ery, as construed by early scholars, is thus broader than the concept of perfidy;
nevertheless, the same basic criteria that are used to distinguish lawful ruses
from unlawful perfidies can be applied to determinations of treachery.34
Finally, Vattel's writings illustrate the possible interrelationship between
norms specifically governing assassination and those more generally applicable
the war is not a violent one, and where the safety of the State is not at stake, such respect for
the person of the sovereign is entirely commendable and in accordance with the mutual duties
of Nations. In such a war, to take away the life of the sovereign of the hostile Nation, when it
could be spared, would be to do a greater injury to that Nation than is, perhaps, necessary for
the successful settlement of the dispute. But it is not a law of war that the person of the enemy's
King must be spared on every occasion, and the obligation to do so exists only when he can
easily be made prisoner.
Id. § 159, at 290.
32. The nature of war has changed so much in recent years that the views of the European scholars
arguably have only nominal bearing on contemporary norms. The initiation of war, for instance, was legal
under customary law at the time of these historical writings. Since World War II, the legality of initiating
war has met considerable debate. The issue, however, is relevant only to the question of whether an act
is wrongful as an illegal resort to force. It does not bear directly on whether a particular category of acts
is illegal per se.
33. See, e.g., NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.1 (discussion of permitted and prohibited
deceptions); AIR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 8-4 to 8-6; ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, arts. 50-
55.
34. The Army Manual treats treachery and perfidy in the same article, without making a textual
distinction between the two terms. ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 50. For additional early condemna-
tion of assassination as a form of treacherous murder, see JOHANN K. BLUNTSCHLI, THE LAW OF WAR
AND NEUTRALrrY § 52 (1878); HENRY W. HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW
OF WAR 181 (1866); T.J. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 540-41 (7th ed. 1923).
Yale Journal of International Law
under international law. Any evaluation of the current status and scope of a
prohibition on assassination must therefore include an analysis of broader
principles not specific to assassination, such as those of necessity.
III. CONTEMPORARY PROHIBITIONS OF ASSASSINATION DURING PEACETIME
A. Major Treaties
Only two major treaties specifically address the topic of assassination: the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)35 and the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention). 6 Both assist
in identifying current attitudes towards assassination.
The OAU charter explicitly addresses assassination. Pursuant to Article
111(5), OAU members adhere to the principle of "unreserved condemnation,
in all its forms, of political assassination . . . "'7 The provision is unique
among charters of regional and international organizations. Although it may
express the view of several, perhaps many, nations, it hardly describes the
current state of international law. At best it serves as a piece of evidence,
weakened by its uniqueness, of a possible customary norm. Moreover, the
ongoing violence that plagues the African continent suggests that the provision
is more hortatory than substantive.
The New York Convention is equally problematic. The Convention entered
into force in 1977 and has been ratified by nearly half the world's nations,
including many of the major powers. Designed to encourage criminalization
of violent acts against certain internationally protected persons, the treaty
encompasses death threats, attempted murder, and accomplice liability. 8
Internationally protected persons include heads of state, foreign ministers, and
representatives of state or international/intergovernmental organizations entitled
to special (usually diplomatic) protection. The treaty also covers family mem-
bers of these officials.39
The treaty imposes three affirmative duties on signatories. First, it requires
each party to promulgate internal laws prohibiting certain acts, and to establish
jurisdiction over cases in which a crime is committed on its territory, the
offender is a national, and the crime is committed against an internationally
protected person.' Second, parties to the treaty must take measures to pre-
35. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963).
36. New York Convention, supra note 5.
37. Id. art. 3, para. 5.
38. Id., art. 2.
39. Id. art. 1.




vent such crimes, either cooperatively or on their own.41 Finally, states har-
boring offenders are obliged to extradite them upon request or, alternatively,
to commence prosecution themselves.4' If the extradition request comes from
a state with which the harboring state has an extradition treaty (an ordinary
condition of extradition), the acts prohibited in the Convention are deemed
incorporated into the catalogue of extraditable offenses contained in that
agreement. When there is no treaty, the Convention may serve as the requisite
mutual relationship.43
The major failing of the New York Convention is that it accords at target
protected status only when the target of assassination is abroad.' Thus, the
murder of protected individuals in their home territory do not trigger the treaty
provisions. Obviously this gap may not be a problem from the perspective of
domestic law enforcement, as the murder of governmental or diplomatic
persons at home presumably would be vigorously investigated and prosecuted.
Nevertheless, the Convention falls short of prescribing an international norm
against assassination.45 Hence, the New York Convention does not treat such
acts as assassination under international law, since they do not violate legisla-
tion promulgated in compliance with the Convention. Moreover, such killings
might go unpunished if the assassin seeks refuge in a state that lacks either an
applicable extradition treaty or domestic legislation authorizing jurisdiction.
Even if domestic law criminalizes the act, the state sheltering the killer could
exercise its discretion, absent an extradition treaty, and choose not to prosecute
the offender. This conduct would not violate the convention.
B. Inferences from Other Legal Norms
State attitudes toward assassination can be inferred from other legal norms.
Murder, for instance, is criminalized in all the world's legal systems and
violence and the use of force are broadly condemned under international law.
Perhaps the most important articulation of the non-violence principle appears
in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) provides: "All
41. Id. art. 4.
42. Id. art. 7.
43. Id. art. 8.
44. For example, the New York Convention defines "Internationally protected person" as:
a Head of State, including any member of a collegial body performing the functions of a Head
of State under the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for
Foreign Affairs, whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of his family
who accompany him.
Id. art. 1, para. 1(a).
45. Although some killings may occur when the victim is abroad, many will not. Indeed, of the five
alleged Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency) assassination attempts investigated by the Church
Committee, all involved targeting the victim in his own nation. See discussion infra notes 190-212 and
accompanying text.
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 17:609, 1992
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.""I
The sole exception to this provision is collective or individual self-defense
pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter.47 In the Nicaragua case, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, quoting the International Law Commission, emphasized
the centrality of the non-violence principle. It stated that 2(4) constituted "a
conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character ofjus
cogens."4 ' The Court then attempted to apply the principle to the facts of the
case.
49
The prohibition against force in interstate relations appears in several other
international instruments. Often the prohibitions occur in regional accords, as
in the Rio Treaty."0 The United Nations has condemned the use of force on
many occasions, most notably in the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accor-
dance With the Charter of the United Nations,"' and in the Definition of
Aggression Resolution. 2 The array of agreements relating to terrorism also
reveals the world community's rejection of violence as an instrument of
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
47. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Id. art. 51.
48. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 90 (June 27) (quoting Droft
Articles on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMNM' 247).
49. See W. Michael Reisman, Termination of the United States Declaration Under Article 36(2) of
the Statute of the International Court, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 71 (Anthony Clark Arend ed., 1986).
50. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21
U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Treaty]. Article 1 provides: "The High Contracting Parties formally condemn
war and undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any
manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty."
51. Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles]. The
Preamble expresses the underlying basis for the Declaration: "[Ilt [is] essential that all States shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations ...."
52. Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974). Article 1 of the Annex defines aggression as "the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.. . ." The legal status of such documents is unclear.
The best view is that the resolution does not bind the Security Council in its consideration of breaches or
threats to peace, since only Charter provisions have this power. Some states, however, take the view that
the definition is a binding interpretation. For a brief discussion of the Definition of Aggression, see 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1982).
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international affairs,53 as do the human rights treaties expressing the impera-
tive of respect for life.'
Certainly, the general condemnation of violence and acts resulting in death
in these international agreements suggests agreement on the wrongfulness of
the taking of life. Any ban on assassination, comports with this principle.
Indeed, any state-sponsored assassination, however defined, would probably
violate the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. Unfortunately, however, these instruments do little to define assassi-
nation as a workable term under international law.
C. Extradition Treaties
Extradition treaties provide another source of information on the contempo-
rary status of assassination during peacetime under international law. Extradi-
tion treaties do not criminalize acts; instead, they rely upon domestic prescrip-
tions and interstate compliance. Nevertheless, the status of particular crimes
covered in extradition treaties indicates state attitudes toward those crimes.
Thus, if the treaties recognize a distinct form of murder perhaps equivalent
to assassination, understanding this distinction will contribute to a broader
understanding of the term under international law.
An excellent early study of extradition treaties was conducted in 1935 by
the Harvard Research in International Law, a group of American scholars
convened under the auspices of the Harvard Law Faculty to prepare draft
conventions at international conferences.55 In preparing the draft extradition
convention, participants surveyed several existing bilateral and multilateral
extradition treaties. They found murder to be a universally extraditable offense.
Most extradition treaties reviewed included assassination within the meaning
of murder, grouping it with such crimes as parricide, poisoning and infanti-
cide. A survey of forty-two bilateral extradition treaties of the United States
53. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 19, 1979, G.A. Res.
34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34146 (1979); Resolution on
Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1985, U.N. Doc. AIRes.140161 (1985); European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976);
OAS Convention on Terrorism, opened for signature Feb. 10, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949 (1976), 10 I.L.M.
255 (1971).
54. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G.A. Res. 217, 183d plen. mtg. at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 1, O.A.S. Res. 30,
May 2, 1948; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
55. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, with Comment, 29 AM.
J. INT'L L. 15 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
56. l app. I1, at 274-96; see, e.g., Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals and for the Protection
Against Anarchism, Jan. 28, 1902, art. mI, 1, in Harvard Research, supra note 55, at 278; Agreement
on Extradition, July 18, 1911, art. 2, 1, in Harvard Research, supra note 55, at 282.
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uniformly found assassination included under the definition of murder.5"
Similarly, in bilateral treaties between nations other than the United States,
assassination was almost universally an extraditable offense,5" several treaties
even treat the murder or attempted murder of a head of state or his family as
a separate extraditable offense.59
The political offense exception in most extradition treaties further illumi-
nates the meaning of assassination under international law. The exception
permits countries to refuse extradition if the offense involved is political by
nature or involves political motivations.' ° The provision derives from eigh-
teenth-century notions of a right to engage in revolutionary activities in the face
of oppression. Governments sought to avoid contributing to the suppression
of foreign citizens by scrutinizing extradition requests of oppressor states.
Signatories accordingly reserved the right to refuse extradition if the alleged
offenses had "pure" political underpinnings. 6
The exception is not without problems. Political offenses can be abhorrent.
A case in point involved the extradition request from France to Belgium for
the surrender of an individual who had placed a bomb under the railway upon
which Emperor Napoleon III was to travel. In accordance with the terms of
the treaty's political offense exception, Belgium refused to extradite the
offender. Appalled by this result, the Belgian parliament promulgated legisla-
tion prohibiting the government from designating certain acts as political. The
legislation provided that an "attack upon the person of the head of a foreign
government or of members of his family, when this attack takes the form of
either murder, assassination, or poisoning" does not fall under the excep-
tion.62 Today, many extradition treaties contain this provision, known as the
attentat clause.63
57. Harvard Research, supra note 55, app. II(A), at 243-44.
58. Id. app. 11(B), at 258-60. A similar formula is employed in British extradition treaties. See, e.g.,
Poland (Extradition) Order in Council, Feb. 26, 1934, U.K.-Pol., 1934 STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS
689; Iraq (Extradition) Order in Council, Apr. 19, 1933, U.K.-Iraq, 1933 STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS
843; Albania (Extradition) Order in Council, June 27, 1927, U.K.-Alb., 1927 STATUTORY RULES &
ORDERS 480; Belgium, Order in Council, Mar. 6, 1902, U.K.-Belg., 1902 STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS
20; Bolivia, Order in Council, Oct. 20, 1898, U.K.-Bol., 1898 STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS 32.
59. See, e.g., Convention for the Extradition of Criminals, Oct. 28, 1926, Liber.-Monaco, 68
L.N.T.S. 241; Extradition Convention, May 31, 1889, Belg.-Neth., 81 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAP. 276;
Extradition Convention, Jan. 15, 1875, Belg.-Italy, 66 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAP. 578.
60. See, e.g., European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 3(1), 359 U.N.T.S. 274
("Extradition shall not be granted if the offense in respect of which it is requested is regarded by the
requested Party as a political offense or as an offense connected with a political offense.*).
61. See The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism, reprinted in 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 58, 60 (Dec.
1985) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser of Department of State, before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee). Although the Draft Convention prepared by the Harvard Research did not list
extraditable offenses, choosing instead to base extractability on the length of the authorized imprisonment
(two years), it included a political offense exception. Harvard Research, supra note 55, art. 5.
62. Harvard Research, supra note 55, art. 5.
63. See, e.g., European Convention on Extradition, supra note 62, art. 3(3) ("The taking or attempted




The general use of attentat clauses is important for two reasons. First, it
indicates that categories of murder differ qualitatively, thereby meriting
separate treatment. To this degree, the attentat clause denotes a distinct legal
norm governing assassination. Secondly, it focuses attention on persons
occupying political positions. Narrowly understood, this focus follows the New
York Convention's approach of basing illegality on the status of the victim.
Accordingly, assassination can be said to include the killing of certain political
figures.
D. State Practice
Contextual consideration of assassination requires investigation beyond the
text of international agreements, to include a consideration of state practice.
National courts presumably would find assassination unlawful. It is unclear,
however, whether courts generally treat assassination as an offense distinct
from murder.
For example, U.S. courts have decided two notable cases concerning
alleged state-sponsored assassination. Letelier v. Republic of Chile concerned
the murder of Orlander Letelier in Washington, D.C., with the alleged com-
plicity of the Chilean government."4 Although Letelier had previously served
as Chile's Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United States, at the time
of his murder he held no official position. In fact, he was in the United States
organizing opposition to the governing regime. 5 When the participation of
the Chilean government became apparent, the United States sought extradition
of those responsible for the murder. Given its own involvement, the Chilean
government not surprisingly denied the request. Letelier's widow then brought
a civil suit against Chile, pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).66 Although the Chilean government did not appear in court, it argued
through diplomatic channels that FSIA was inapplicable under the discretionary
the purposes of this Convention."); see also Supplementary Treaty Concerning Extradition, June 8, 1972,
U.S.-U.K.-Ir., art. 1(c), 28 U.S.T. 227, 24 I.L.M. 1105 (1985) (offenses within scope of Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons are not political offenses
for purposes of extradition treaty); Treaty Concerning Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, June 27, 1962, Belg.-Neth.-Lux., art. 3(2)(a), 616 U.N.T.S. 79 (offenses against head of state
or member of reigning royal family are not political offenses for purposes of treaty); Convention on
Extradition Adopted by the Seventh International Conference of American States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 3(e),
49 Stat. 3111, 165 L.N.T.S. 45 (attempts against life of chief of state or family members are not political
offenses). The Harvard Research did not include an aenta clause in its Draft Convention since some
states, including Switzerland and the Netherlands, refused to include the clause in their treaties, maintaining
that an attack upon a head of state is a political offense by nature. Harvard Research, supra note 55, at
116-17.
64. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
65. Interview with Professor Pablo Ruiz-Tagle, Universidad Diego Portales, in New Haven, Conn.
(Mar. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Ruiz-Tagle Interview].
66. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
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act of state exemption in the statute. 7 The district court, however, held that
"[w]hatever policy options may exist for a foreign country, [the Chilean
government] has no 'discretion' to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the
assassination of an individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to
the precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international
law."68 While the current Chilean government did not agree to extradite the
suspects, it passed legislation providing compensation to Letelier's family and
reopened criminal prosecutions against them.69
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly condemned state-sponsored
assassination in Liu v. Republic of China.7" Henry Liu, a journalist and histo-
rian originally from Taiwan, moved to California where he became an outspo-
ken critic of the Taipei regime. He was subsequently murdered by two gunmen
acting on the orders of Admiral Wong, Director of the Republic of China's
Defense Intelligence Bureau. As in Letelier, subject-matter jurisdiction arose
under FSIA.71 Taiwan based its defense on the act of state doctrine, which
generally provides that courts of one state will not sit in judgment on the
domestic acts of another state.'
The Ninth Circuit determined that a relevant factor in applying the act of
state doctrine was the degree of international consensus concerning the alleged
act. Citing both the New York Convention and treaties relating to terrorism,
it found that an international consensus condemned murder. The court held that
the "act of state doctrine does not automatically bar a suit against a foreign
nation when it is alleged that the nation ordered the assassinati6n of an Ameri-
can citizen within the United States. 3
Courts in the United Kingdom have also condemned assassination. In
Crown v. Gill the Court of Appeals upheld a harsh sentence applied to conspir-
ators in an assassination plot against Rajiv Gandhi.74 Similarly, in Crown v.
Al-Banna the court upheld the sentences of three Palestine National Liberation
Movement members convicted of the attempted assassination of the Israeli
ambassador to Great Britain.75 Responding to potential criticism that the
sentences were excessive, the court noted: "It should be clearly understood that
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1988). The section provides for immunity against "any claim based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless
of whether the discretion be abused." Id.
68. 488 F. Supp. at 673.
69. Ruiz-Tagle Interview, supra note 65.
70. 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
71. a at 1421-23.
72. The principles of the act of state doctrine are set forth in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,
252 (1897).
73. 892 F.2d at 1434. For a discussion of Liu, see Fletcher Alford, When Nations Kill: The Liu Case
and the Act of State Doctrine in Wrongful Death Suits, 12 HASTINGs INT'L & COmp. L. REV. 465 (1989).
74. R. v. Gill, 1989 Crim. L.R. 358 (U.K.).
75. Crown v. Al-Banna, 6 Crim. App. R. 426 (1984) (U.K.).
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political murders or attempted political murders of this sort and kindred
offenses will be met where appropriate with sentences of this length, namely
30 or 35 years. For the parts played by these men these sentences were
manifestly condign and accurate."76
These cases, though limited in scope, suggest that at least in the Western
tradition assassination is distinct from murder and merits harsher punishment.
They imply that assassination also includes the killing of individuals not
occupying protected positions. In both of the U.S. cases, assassination was
seen as driven by a political purpose. The British cases could also be viewed
in this context. Most killings of political figures or government officials are
likely to be politically motivated; not all political killings, however, are likely
to be of such individuals. This cursory look at the case law thus reflects a
broader understanding of assassination than that found in the relevant interna-
tional agreements discussed above.
A more general examination of international relations also sheds light on
existing attitudes toward assassination. As Professor Reisman has observed,
there are "two 'relevant' normative legal systems: one that is supposed to
apply, which continues to enjoy lip service among elites, and one that is
actually applied."77 The first he describes as the "myth system," the second
the "operational code."7 Pinpointing the myth system with regard to assassi-
nation is difficult since concrete law on this point is sparse. Although the
absence of a definitive myth system does not necessarily preclude the existence
of an operational code, Professor Reisman and his colleague, James Baker,
recently concluded that an operational code governing assassination is difficult
to articulate:79 "Because of the difficulties of definition, legal analysis of the
lawfulness of [assassination] is best resolved with a contextual reading of each
case which relies on both political context and reference to the traditional
doctrines governing the use of force: proportionality, necessity and discrimina-
tion concerning the target.""0
The merit of this conclusion is demonstrated in the truism that "one man's
terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." The same states that condemned
the U.S. bombing of Libya as an attempt to kill Qadhafi supported the imposi-
tion of a death penalty against the author Salman Rushdie. Those who de-
nounced Israeli attacks upon Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders
applauded assassinations by the PLO of Israeli officials. As Professor Reisman
76. Id.
77. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 15-16 (1979), quoted
in W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS
AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW 23 (1992).
78. On the myth system and the operational code, see REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 77, at 23-24);
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 23-35 (1987).
79. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 77, at 69-71.
80. Id. at 71.
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notes, actual behavior may deviate from both the myth system and the opera-
tional code."1 In the case of assassination, however, uncovering the operation-
al code itself seems impossible.
The assassination of Abu Jihad illustrates this point. On the morning of
April 16, 1988, a team of nine Israeli commandos entered the Tunis home of
Khalil al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad, and murdered him in front of his
family. At the time, Abu Jihad was a top PLO military strategist who had
previously been implicated in several terrorist attacks against Israel. 2 Tunisia
brought the matter to the attention of the Security Council, claiming a violation
of its sovereignty and territorial integrity." By a vote of fourteen to none,
the United States abstaining, the Security Council denounced the Israeli
action." Yet the resolution made no mention of assassination; instead, the
Security Council limited itself to condemning "vigorously the aggression,
perpetrated... against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tunisia in
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and
norms of conduct. "I
The omission is perhaps due to the matter's technical posture as a territo-
riality/sovereignty dispute. Yet the Security Council was not procedurally
bound to limit the resolution to the initial complaint. It presumably chose not
to address the glaring issue of state-sponsored assassination. The incident
provides some measure of the unease with which international bodies handle
the politically sensitive issue of assassination. Furthermore, a review of the
Security Council proceedings reveals a conspicuous silence by certain states
on the issue of assassination. Although the delegates who spoke during the
deliberations uniformly condemned the act (including the ambassador of the
United States, which abstained because the resolution failed to reflect a propor-
tional allocation of blame for violence in the Middle East86), many restricted
their statements to the themes of territoriality and sovereignty. The PLO
representative and the Syrian and Tunisian ambassadors did mention assassina-
tion, but they focused on the sovereignty issue. The Kuwaiti and Jordanian
81. Id. at 23.
82. See Dan Fischer & John M. Brodie, Value ofIsrael's Assassination PolicyDebated, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1988, at 1; Statement ofMr. Mestiri, Representative of Tnisia, U.N. SCOR, 43d Seas., 2807th
mtg. at 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2807 (1988).
83. Statement of Mr. Mestiri, supra note 82, at 7.
84. S.C. Res. 911, U.N. SCOR, 43d Seas., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/19798 (1988).
85. Id.
86. Despite the strong views the United States holds on political assassination, and despite our
strong support for Tunisia's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the United States has
decided to abstain in the vote on the draft today because it disproportionately places all blame
for this latest round in the rising spiral of violence in the Middle East on one event only while
failing to mention other actions that preceded it. It also includes language which is suggestive
of Chapter VI sanctions.
Statement ofAmbassador Okun, Representative of the United States, Apr. 25,1988, U.N. SCOR, 43d Seas.,
2810th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2810 (1988).
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representatives took a similar approach. Interestingly the non-Middle Eastern
delegates tended to concentrate on the issue of assassination. 7
Although the reasons for this apparent split are purely speculative, the
debate clearly evidenced a hesitancy to condemn political assassination un-
equivocally. Perhaps the Middle-Eastern representatives thought that emphasiz-
ing territoriality and sovereignty would avert a U.S. veto. This strategy
illustrates the uncertainty surrounding assassination in international law, at least
concerning more established concepts like territoriality and sovereignty.
It is more likely, though still speculative, that some states down-played the
assassination issue because it was a prohibition they did not want to endorse
strongly on the record. Some of them support the PLO, which uses assassi-
nation on a regular basis; and some of the states either directly or indirectly
have been involved in such acts. Hence, it would not be in their long-term
interest to dwell on assassination and thereby provide their opponents with
ammunition to use in denouncing their future misdeeds.
E. Conclusions
The Security Council proceedings in the Abu Jihad affair indicate that
although the international community views political assassination as wrong
in principle, in practice that view is ambiguous, or worse, bereft of substance.
The affair reveals that the operational code and any prescriptive conclusions
remain elusive. Outside the law of armed conflict, international norms concern-
ing assassination are scarce. The preceding discussion nonetheless provides
six general guidelines as a basis for further inquiry.
First, the New York Convention, the OAU Charter, extradition treaties,
case law, and international reaction to incidents such as the killing of Abu
Jihad demonstrate that assassination is an illegal offense under international
law, and that it constitutes an offense qualitatively different from murder.
Second, assassination involves the targeting of a particular individual. None
of the authorities indicates that assassination includes indiscriminate killing.
Thus for acts to be understood as assassination, they must be directed against
specific targets.
Third, assassinations are killings with political overtones. How this is to
be determined, however, remains uncertain. At a minimum, the murder of a
head of state (assuming the killing was politically motivated) meets the criteria
for assassination, as the prevalence of attentat clauses in extradition treaties
demonstrates. It becomes less clear that a killing will rise to the level of
87. See generally U.N. SCOR, 43d Sess., 2807th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2807-2810 (1988). The
statement of Sir Crispin Tickell of the United Kingdom provides an apt example: "[S]upport or sponsorship
of murder by Governments is doubly repugnant; it is a betrayal of the natural expectation of the internation-
al community that Governments will uphold the rule of law. .. ." Id. at 49.
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assassination as one moves further down the hierarchy of government. For
example, attentat clauses fall short of the scope of the New York Convention,
case law, and state practice.
Fourth, an act with a transnational component is more likely to be charac-
terized as assassination under international law than an intrastate act. The New
York Convention's failure to criminalize violent acts within home territories
illustrates the deference shown to domestic competence in such matters.
Fifth, legal prescriptions governing assassination yield to overriding
political concerns. Since the criteria for assassination are ambiguous, states
are likely to characterize a killing to suit their own purposes. This inability to
identify an operational code demonstrates the contextual nature of the charac-
terization of assassination.
Finally, state-sponsored killings breach other domestic or international
prescriptions in most cases, regardless of whether the acts technically constitute
assassination. These acts constitute murder under domestic law, and probably
violate international prohibitions on the use of force, such as Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter. Simply because a killing is not assassination does not mean
that it is legal, or even justified.
IV. CONTEMPORARY PROHIBITIONS UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Modern concepts of assassination follow their historical predecessors by
primarily confronting the problem in the context of armed conflict. Prohibitions
of assassination under the laws of war suffer the same defect, lack of defini-
tional clarity, as is found in peacetime prohibitions. Yet the attempts to
establish operational codes under the laws of war provide specific elements
that are essential to a modern understanding of assassination.
A. From General Order 100 to the Oxford Manual
It was not until the nineteenth century that any state attempted to formalize
a prohibition on assassination under the laws of war.88 This attempt originated
during the Civil War in the work of Francis Lieber, a professor at Columbia
College. The result of his work, the Lieber Code, was subsequently reviewed
and revised by a board of military officers and promulgated as General Order
88. According to J.M. Spaight,
China appears to be the solitary civilized nation which has countenanced the methods of
the assassin in modem war. In her war with Japan, Sung, Imperial Commissioner, is stated to
have posted notices in Northern Manchuria, offering 10,000 taels for the decapitation of three
Japanese generals. Other wars furnish instances of assassination or attempted assassination, but
in no case can the practice be proved to have been authorised by the Government or its command-
ers in the field.
J.M. SPAIGhT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 86 (1911) (footnotes omitted).
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100 by President Lincoln in 1863.9 Article 148 of that order presented the
first formal ban on assassination:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the
hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who
may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modem law of peace
allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The
sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of such
proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with horror upon
offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.'
While General Order 100 clearly prohibited assassination, the precise definition
of the term was unclear. Despite this lack of clarity, modem codification
efforts, like their historical counterparts, retained the concept of treachery as
the linchpin of assassination. General Order 100 did not create a new category;
instead, as will be seen, it merely attempted to include "outlawry" as a form
of treachery.
In addition, although General Order 100 was binding only on members of
the U.S. military, it was influential in subsequent codification attempts. A
similar effort took place during the Brussels Conference of 1874. Convened
by Czar Alexander II of Russia, representatives of European nations met to
consider a law of war convention prepared by the Russians. The proposed
convention was adopted with only minor revisions, but was never ratified.9'
Nevertheless, the Brussels Declaration represents an important link in the
evolution from the historical writings to current wartime assassination prohibi-
tions, as the Declaration outlawed "[m]urder by treachery of individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army.
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The Brussels Declaration influenced the work of the International Law
Institute. Founded in 1873 to foster codification of international legal princi-
ples, the Institute adopted a manual on the law of war, the Oxford Manual,
in 1880.91 Its author, Gustave Moynier, used the Brussels Declaration as a
guide, by prohibiting any "treacherous attempt on the life of an enemy.
94
89. Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, Introductory Note to Francis Lieber, Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, in THE LAws OF ARMED CoNFLICTs 3 (Dietrich
Schindler & Jir Toman eds., 1973) (1863) [hereinafter ARMED CoNFLICTs]; see also RICHARD S.
HARTIGAN, LimER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 1-26 (1983); George B. Davis, DoctorFrancisLieber's
Instructions for the Government ofArmies in the Field, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 13 (1907); Ernest Nys, Francis
Lieber-His Life and Work, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 84 (1911); Elihu Root, Francis Lieber, 7 AM. J. INT'L L.
453 (1913).
90. General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, art. 148 [hereinafter General Order 100], reprinted in
ARE MD CoNFUCrS, supra note 89, at 3.
91. Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, Introductory Note to Brussels Conference of 1874, in ARM ED
CONFuLrs, supra note 89, at 3.
92. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Law and Customs of War, Aug. 27, 1874,
art. 13 [hereinafter Brussels Declaration], reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 96 (Supp. 1907).
93. TB- LAWS OF WAR ON LAND (1880) (U.K.) [hereinafter OXFoRD MANUAL], reprinted in ARMED
CONFLICrs, supra note 89, at 35.
94. Id. art. 8.
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B. Hague IV and the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions
In 1899, Russia convened the First Hague Peace Conference with the goal
of revising the Brussels Declaration, which carried forward the standard
prohibition on assassination in the form defined by General Order 100, the
Brussels Declaration, and the Oxford Manual. The Conference produced the
Convention on Land Warfare and a set of attached regulations.9" This Con-
vention subsequently was revised at the Second Hague Peace Conference in
1907, now almost universally ratified as the Hague IV Convention and its
annexed Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.96
Since its promulgation, Hague IV has achieved the status of customary interna-
tional law, a fact acknowledged by the.Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal in 194697 and by contemporary manuals on the law of war.91
The implementation of the Hague Regulations at the national level finally
made explicit the relationship between assassination and treachery. General
Order 100 outlawed assassination but failed to mention treachery. Subsequent
codification efforts focused on the issue of treachery without specifically citing
assassination. Article 23(b) of the Hague Regulations, however, provides that
"it is especially forbidden to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging
to the hostile nation or army." 99 Lest there be any doubt that the Hague
Regulations apply to acts of assassination, the current U.S. Army manual, The
Law of Land Warfare (Army Manual), explicitly interprets Article 23(b) to so
apply. x°
Other manuals on the law of war took a similar approach. For example,
the most recent codification effort, conducted under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), produced the Protocols Additional
95. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
1803, T.S. No. 403, reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 89, at57; see also THOMAS E. HOLLAND,
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, AS DEFINED BY THBE HAGUE CONVENTiON OF 1899 (1904).
96. Hague IV, supra note 7.
97. "[B]y 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and
were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war. .. ." International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INr'L L. 248-49 (Supp.
1947).
98. See, e.g., NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 5.14 n.16.
99. Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 23(b).
100. Article 31 of the manual reprints Article 23(d) of the Hague regulations. It then provides the
following commentary:
This article is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or
putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy "dead or alive."
It does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether
in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere.
ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 31.
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to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.101 Protocol I retains the pro-
hibition on assassination in slightly modified form. Article 37 states:
It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts
inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled
to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall
constitute perfidy."°2 This provision was designed to incorporate the prohibi-
tions contained in Article 23(b) of Hague IV." The evolution of the assassi-
nation standard through these codification efforts demonstrates that the prohibi-
tion should now be interpreted as the treacherous killing of one's enemy."
C. Domestic Manuals on the Law of War
A survey of the manuals on the law of war also reveals that the wartime
assassination ban in international agreements and scholarly commentary has
entered the operational code. These manuals are an essential component in the
implementation of armed conflict prescriptions. They are the best evidence,
short of actual hostilities, of the boundaries of the operational code.
These manuals have adopted the prohibitions set forth in international
agreements almost verbatim. The U.S. Army Manual, for example, directly
incorporates Article 23(b) of Hague IV." The commentary to Article 31
of the Manual makes clear that the provision is intended to include assassina-
tion. " The Air Force version, International Law-The Conduct of Armed
Conflict and Air Operations (Air Force Manual), basically repeats this lan-
guage."° The Navy manual, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations (Navy Manual), does not specifically address assassination.
However, one can conclude that the Navy Manual similarly forbids assassi-
nation, since it proscribes perfidy, the rough equivalent of treachery, and it
101. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 2), June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Protocol II], reprinted in 16 I.L.M.
1391 (1977); International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949 (1977) [hereinafter ICRC].
102. Protocol I, supra note 101, art. 37.
103. INTERNATIONAL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, § 1491 (1987) [hereinafter ICRC
Commentary]; see also MICHAEL BOTHE Er AL., NEw RULES FOR VIcTims OF ARMED CONFLCTS 202-03
(1982).
104. Although the United States has not ratified the Protocols, it accepts this limitation. See NAVY
MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.4 n.3.
105. ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 31.
106. Id.
107. AIR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 8-6d.
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recommends Protocol I's prohibition."0 8 Foreign manuals contain similar
assassination prohibitions."
D. Some Conclusions: A Definition of Wartime Assassination
It is possible to derive from these sources a definition of wartime assassina-
tion containing two elements: the targeting of an individual, and the use of
treacherous means. An act committed during hostilities that meets these criteria
is forbidden absolutely, regardless of motivation. Conversely, an act lacking
either element, wrongful or not," 0 does not amount to assassination, regard-
less of the identity of the target, the means employed or the requirements of
necessity and proportionality that govern the use of force.
1. Targeting Individuals
The first criterion derives from several sources. At the most basic level,
assassination is not indiscriminate killing. All codification efforts attempted
to define assassination as the targeting of specific individuals. For example,
General Order 100 uses the phrases "an individual ... a citizen ... a subject
. . . an outlaw.""' The Brussels Declaration speaks of "individuals,""2
whereas the Oxford Manual forbids a treacherous attempt on the life of "an
enemy." ' The Hague Regulations likewise employ the term "individu-
als,""' while Protocol I condemns the resort to perfidy against "an adver-
sary.""' s This textual evidence demonstrates the requirement of individual
targeting." 6
108. NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.1.2 & n.3. Additionally, in discussing basic principles of
the law of armed conflict, the NavyManual mentions treachery in the context of understanding the principle
of chivalry. Id. § 5.2 & n.7.
109. The British version provides that "[a]ssassinatiofi, the killing or wounding of a selected individual
behind the line of battle by enemy agents or partisans ... and the killing or wounding by treachery of
individuals belonging to the opposing nation or army, are not lawful acts of war." WAR OeI cB, THE LAW
OF WAR ON LAND, BEING PART III OF THE MANUAL OF MILTARY LAW art. 115 (1958) (U.K.) [hereinafter
BRrTSH MANUAL], reprinted in 10 DIe. INT'L L. 390 (1968).
110. For example, although making civilians the object of attack is wrongful under the laws of war,
it is not assassination per se.
111. General Order 100, supra note 90, art. 148 (emphasis added).
112. Brussels Declaration, supra note 92, art. 13 (emphasis added).
113. OxFORD MANUAL, supra note 93, art. 8(b).
114. Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 23(b).
115. Protocol 1, supra note 101, art. 37.
116. The existence of separate restrictions on perfidy in Article 50 of theArry Manual also supports
this conclusion. ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 50. The coexistence of Articles 31 and 50 suggests
they have distinct meanings; the logical conclusion is that Article 31 covers individual perfidious killing,




Even more certainly required is the element of treachery, which historically
was a critical component of assassination and is reiterated consistently in
codifications of the law of war." 7 It is the key feature of wartime assassina-
tion today.
The essence of treachery is a breach of confidence. For instance, an attack
on an individual who justifiably believes he has nothing to fear from the assail-
ant is treachery."' The requirement of treachery is not found in peacetime
prohibitions on assassination, however. Indeed, the means employed to kill
one's victim in peacetime are only marginally relevant, as it is primarily the
political motivation that defines that offense." 9
a. Rationales
This distinction is critical. The wartime ban, unlike its peacetime counter-
part, is not designed to protect particular categories of individuals. 12 o The
law of armed conflict achieves this result by differentiating between combatants
and noncombatants, not by banning assassination. The law of armed conflict
ban serves two other essential functions. First, it keeps war orderly and
predictable, which contributes to the manageability of conflict. Although
seemingly contradictory, an element of trust must exist between parties in war
on certain basic matters. Wartime assassination, due to its treacherous nature,
encourages a sense of paranoia that inevitably leads to excesses and hinders
the possibility of negotiations.'
Second, the ban is humanitarian. Noncombatants enjoy protected status
under the law of armed conflict. Abusing that status can lead to a dangerous
uhraveling of the standards of conduct, a phenomenon illustrated by the My
Lai massacre." Once the line between combatants and noncombatants begins
117. According to the British Manual, for example, the prohibition on assassination *applies only to
treacherous killing." BRrTISH MANUAL, supra note 109, art. 115 cmt.
118. J.M. Spaight notes that '[i]t is the essence of treachery that the offender assumes a false character
by which he deceives his enemy and thereby is able to effect a hostile act which, had he come under his
true colours, he could not have done. He takes advantage of his enemy's reliance on his honour." SPAIoHT,
supra note 88, at 87.
119. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
120. The peacetime prohibition serves to protect individuals involved in international affairs. In other
words, the ban is a recognition that the death of specific individuals will upset stability in the international
system. The war prohibition focuses on the method used to kill, not on the legitimacy of the target.
121. Even unconditional surrender requires negotiations; only total destruction of the state would
foreclose the need for them. In light of modem weaponry, such as chemical munitions, a strategy of total
destruction would seem foolhardy. One objective of any campaign must be to avoid driving the enemy to
act irrationally.
122. United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973). In the My Lai incident, Lt.
Calley had received intelligence reports that no civilians were in the area. Calley argued that the subsequent
killing of civilians, including children, did not evidence the degree of malice or mens rea requisite for
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to blur, self-preservation dictates a presumption in favor of combatant status
in questionable cases." 2 The assassination prohibition, like the more general
restriction on perfidy, is designed to brighten the line.
b. Examples
These two rationales permit an evaluation of the ban in concrete situations.
It is necessary to observe that surprise alone can never constitute assassina-
tion.11 An enemy has no right to believe he is free from attack without prior
notice. Thus, had the Abu Jihad affair occurred in the context of warfare
without the issues of sovereignty and territoriality, the Israeli action may have
been acceptable, for the commando team was in uniform at the time of the
assault."2s
Similarly, the use of aircraft to kill a specific individual would not consti-
tute assassination unless those aircraft were improperly marked with protective,
for example medical, symbols. The same analysis applies to naval vessels.
The prohibition on treachery does not require attackers to meet their victim
face to face. Thus, a special forces team may legitimately place a bomb in the
residence of its target or shoot him from a camouflaged position. Such actions
do not involve misuse of protected status, and so involve no perfidy.
What would violate the ban? Article 37 of Protocol I offers four examples
of perfidy that would clearly amount to treachery if used to kill a specific
individual: 1) feigning a desire to negotiate under a truce or surrender flag;
2) feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness; 3) feigning civilian, non-
combatant status; and 4) feigning protected status by the use of signs, emblems
or uniforms of the United Nations, neutral states, or other states not party to
the conflict. 1" Thus, if the Iraqi officers surrendering to General Schwartz-
murder. 22 C.M.A. at 539, 48 C.M.R. at 24. The court ruled that even if the victims had been enemy
soldiers, killing unresisting prisoners is prohibited. 22 C.M.A. at 540, 48 C.M.R. at 25. Nonetheless, the
affair aptly illustrates the dangers posed by blurring the distinctions between combatants and noncombatants.
123. This presumption refers to actual engagements of the enemy; they are distinguishable from
situations involving capture and the according of prisoner-of-war status. Article 45 of Protocol I provides
for a presumption of prisoner-of-war status in the case of doubt. Protocol I, supra note 101, art. 45. The
United States supports this position. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation
of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM.
U. J. INTI'L L. & POL'Y 419, 425 (1987).
124. See, e.g., SPAIGrr, supra note 88, at 88; Parks, supra note 4, at 5. The comments to the British
Manual's article on assassination states that "lilt is not forbidden to send a detachment or individual
members of the armed forces to kill, by sudden attack, members or a member of the enemy armed forces."
BRsIH MANUAL, supra note 109, art. 115 cmt.
125. In the comments to Article 115 of the British Manual, the 1943 commando raid on Rommel's
African Army at Beda Littoriawas cited as an example of an operation permissible under the assassination
ban. These comments reason that the commandos were in military uniform and that the operation was
intended to seize the enemy headquarters and capture or kill enemy personnel. BRITIsH MANUAL, supra
note 109, art. 115 cmt.




kopf in the Gulf War had killed him during negotiations, the act would have
amounted to assassination. Likewise, if they had left a bomb in the tent, the
surrender would have constituted a treacherous subterfuge for the purpose of
assassinating the general.
Offering bounty or a reward for the death of one's enemy is also regarded
as treacherous. The Army Manual and Air Force Manual explicitly cite this
prohibition.127 Although absent in Hague IV, the prohibition was included in
the Oxford Manual as an example of treachery.' Offering rewards for
assassination was also prohibited in General Order 100.11, Since General
Order 100 and the Oxford Manual both served as models for Hague IV, the
prohibition must be understood as retaining validity.
c. Civilian Clothes, Irregulars, and Wearing the Enemy's Uniform
A more troublesome issue is whether plainclothes actors can target an
individual without acting treacherously. Soldiers are obliged to wear uniforms
to distinguish them from civilians protected by noncombatant status. 3 ' He-
nce, engaging the enemy while disguised in civilian clothes constitutes perfidy.
Protocol I and the manuals on the law of armed conflict select precisely this
act to illustrate perfidy."' Moreover, attacking the enemy disguised as a
civilian is a war crime, 132 and those captured out of uniform risk losing
prisoner-of-war status. A member of the armed forces who kills a targeted
127. ARMY MANUAL, supranote 19, art. 31; AIR FORCEMANUAL, supra note 19, 1 8-6d. The British
Manual also prohibits the offering of bounties. "In view of the prohibition of assassination, the proscription
or outlawing or the putting of a price on the head of an enemy individual or any offer for an enemy 'dead
or alive' is forbidden." BRiTISH MANUAL, supra note 109, art. 116. Perceptively, the Manual indicates
that this prohibition is driven less by a concern that assassination may be encouraged than by a belief that
the offer of rewards would create a tendency to deny quarter. Id. art. 116 cmt. The Hague regulations
specifically forbid denying quarter. Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 23(d).
128. "It is forbidden ... to make treacherous attempts upon the life of an enemy; as, for example,
by keeping assassins in pay or by feigning to surrender... .' OXFORD MANUAL, supra note 93, art. 8(b).
129. General Order 100, supra note 90, art. 148.
130. Aircrews, however, are not technically required to wear uniforms since the markings on the
aircraft suffice to place others on notice of their combatant status. Nevertheless, United States policy
requires Air Force personnel to wear uniforms for their own protection in the event they are shot down.
Am FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 1 7-3a.
131. See, e.g., Protocol 1, supra note 101, art. 37.1(c); AIR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 8-
6a(3); NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.7. The commentary to Protocol I indicates that this example
was selected because it was indisputable. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 103, 11 1501-05; see also
BOTHE ET AL., supra note 103, at 205; INTERNATIONAL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF
GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPmENTOF INTERNATIONAL HUMANrrARIAN
LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 105 (1971).
132. NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.7.
133. See, e.g., ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 74; AIR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 1 7-2;
see also Geneva Convention Relativeto the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 139 [hereinafter Geneva I1].
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individual while intentionally out of uniform arguably has committed an act
of assassination. 13
4
The same conclusion relates to those wearing the enemy's uniform.135
The prohibition against wearing the garb of one's opponent, codified in Article
23(f) of the Hague Regulations applies only to combat situations, however.
Wearing an enemy uniform, or even using the enemy flag, prior to or follow-
ing battle is not necessarily restricted. 136 Interestingly, Article 23(f) does not
specifically make the timing distinction; yet when disputes arose during the
Second World War concerning its meaning, direct involvement in combat was
the determinative factor.
137
Article 39(2) of Protocol I confused the matter. The article "prohibited
[the] use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse
Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favor, protect or impede
military operations. '  Protocol I, therefore, discards the post-World War
II understanding, and would forbid ingress to or egress from the area of opera-
tions by those wearing the enemy's uniform. The United States opposes Article
39 as non-reflective of the nature of modern combat;139 and United States
enemies are likely to employ this mode of deception regardless of the prohibi-
tion in Article 39."4 Accordingly, the United States resists compliance as
disadvantageous. 
141
In light of contrary state practice, Article 39 is not binding on non-signato-
ries and does not supplant the timing distinction developed in the post-war era.
The wearing of an enemy uniform or insignia for the purposes of getting to
134. State practice, however, does not always follow this standard. Parks observes that in World War
II a British officer was decorated for using civilian clothing to infiltrate German headquarters to kill a
general. Parks, supra note 4, at 6.
135. See Valentine Jobst 1I, Is Wearing of the Enemy's Uniform a Violation of the Laws of War?,
35 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (1941).
136. The general rule, however, is the following: "it is especially forbidden to make improper use
of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the
distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention." Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 23(0; see also ARMY MANUAL,
supra note 19, art. 54; AIR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 8-6c; NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, §
12.5.3.
137. AiR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 8-6c; NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 12.5.3 n.15;
BoTHE Er AL., supra note 103, at 212-15. In Trial of Scorzeny and Others, a military court held that
soldiers wearing enemy uniforms could not be tried as war criminals unless they had engaged the enemy.
9 W.C.R. 90, 93-94 (U.S. Zone-Germany, Gen. Mil. Gov. Ct. 1947). Standards for improper use of
uniforms, however, differ in regard to prisoners entitled to prisoner of war status.
138. Protocol I, supra note 101, art. 39(2) (emphasis added).
139. See Matheson, supra note 123, at 425, 435. Matheson was Deputy Legal Adviser at the State
Department when he made the comments.
140. See, e.g., John J. Dziak, The Soviet Approach to Special Operations, in SPECIAL OPERATIONS
IN U.S. STRATEGY 95 (Frank R. Barnett et al. eds., 1984) (concerning spetsnaz operations).
141. For further discussion of Article 39, see Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The
Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 148-50 (1985); George H.
Aldrich, Progressive Development ofthe Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol




an operation location is therefore legitimate. Wearing the enemy's uniform is
treacherous only if an attack is executed while the enemy uniform is worn.
Using irregular forces, such as guerrillas, to carry out attacks against
specific individuals presents more difficult analytical problems. Article 1 of
the Hague Regulations and Article 4 of the Geneva Convention on prisoners
of war require that "militia and volunteer corps" wear a "fixed distinctive
emblem recognizable at a distance" and "carry arms openly."" In most
cases, however, irregulars have ignored these requirements. Guerrillas seldom
wear uniforms, for example.
Though permitting irregulars to engage in combat without uniforms con-
tradicts the general rule against treachery, state practice arguably has served
a legitimizing function. Here, the rules of the operational code vary from the
myth system. Some states have attempted to correct the discrepancy, as
illustrated by the coordinated efforts of the United States and the United
Kingdom to amend their war manuals after World War II. With regard to
assassination, the most important change was the revision of the Army Man-
ual's commentary to Article 31. Previously, it had simply listed acts that
constituted treacherous killings. The current version contains the following
caveat: "[the prohibition] does not, however, preclude attacks on individual
soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied
territory, or elsewhere. "143 The inclusion of this caveat, as indicated in the
annotation to the manual, was motivated by a desire "not-to foreclose activity
by resistance movements, paratroops, and other belligerents who may attack
individual persons.""
Despite the problem posed by irregular soldiers, the basic standards relating
to lawful combatant status set forth in the Hague Regulations have not been
abandoned. The United States opposition to relaxing the criteria in Protocol
I demonstrates this. Article 44(3) of Protocol I grants an irregular combatant
status, provided that he carries arms openly "i) during each military engage-
ment," and "ii) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which
he is to participate. '" 145 Acts complying with these requirements are not per-
fidious under Protocol I.146 The change reflects the concern that in modern
armed conflict combatants may not always be able to distinguish themselves
from noncombatants.147 The United States, however, understandably attacked
142. Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 1; Geneva III, supra note 133, art. 4.
143. ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 31.
144. Parks, supra note 4, at 6. The annotation, however, should not be read too broadly. It was
designed to recognize the existence of partisan activity in modem warfare; it was not, however, intended
to dispense with all requirements for distinguishing combatants from noncombatants.
145. Protocol I, supra note 101, art. 44(3).
146. Id.
147. IL This justification is contained in the text of the article itself.
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the provision as contrary to the primary goal of securing the protection of
noncombatants.
141
This uncertainty presents substantial problems in applying the assassination
ban. Even those opposing Article 39 have recognized the need for relaxing
some of the rules. At the same time, opposition to the article demonstrates that
the norm it expresses is insufficiently accepted to constitute a binding prescrip-
tion.149 The question, then, is what acts constitute treachery on the part of
irregulars under current law.
One approach focuses on the motive for wearing civilian clothing and on
the reasonableness of the target's belief that he is free from risk of attack. The
inquiry would determine whether irregulars don civilian clothing for the
purpose of avoiding detection or for deceiving the target into believing he has
nothing to fear. The former case would not be treachery; the latter probably
would."'° This standard derives from the historical understanding of treach-
ery.
Although the standard is a difficult one to apply, a few illustrations help
to elucidate it. Wearing civilian clothing to pass through a populated area prior
to an attack, for example, might be an acceptable practice. Since the operation
does not yet involve focusing on the target, he has no reason to vest "confi-
dence" in those conspiring against him. Similarly, wearing civilian clothing
in an ambush does not violate the standard because the target is unaware of
the assailants.
By contrast, irregulars commit treachery if they use their apparent noncom-
batant status to get closer to the target than they otherwise would. If they wear
civilian dress in a crowd to facilitate movements upon a target, they take
advantage of the target's perception that he is surrounded by harmless noncom-
148. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Position of the United States on CurrentLaw of War, 2AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 460, 463 (1987).
149. Interestingly, the ICRC draft listed the "disguising of combatants in civilian clothing" as an
example of perfidy under Article 37. However, the phrase was removed in response to concerns that it
contradicted the more relaxed requirements relating to irregulars of Article 44. BOTHE ET AL., supra note
103, at 205.
150. One assertion supporting this approach comes in a comment on the Protocol I prohibition on
perfidy. According to Bothe, Partsch, and Solf, a breach of Article 37 requires the act of perfidy to be
the proximate cause of the killing. Remote causal links are insufficient. BoTHE ET AL., supra note 103,
at 204. In the same way, the suggested standard imposes a requirement analogous to proximate cause.
An interesting case involved the 1942 killing of S.S. General Reinhard Heydrich en route to his office
in Prague. Two Czech nationals had parachuted into Czechoslovakia from a British airplane with the
specific mission of killing Heydrich. As his car slowed to round a turn, the men blew it up with a grenade.
Heydrich was killed. One commentator characterizes the act as assassination because "[w]ith full knowledge
of the country and the language, they were able, under the cloak of civilian clothing, to accomplish what
a British battalion could not have done." Joseph B. Kelly, Assassination in War ime, 30 MiL. L. REv.
101, 104 (1965). He reasons from this incident that the restriction on killing while out of uniform should
be relaxed. Id. at 111. The British Manual similarly characterized the act as assassination yet concluded




batants. The use of apparent noncombatant status to gain entry into a facility
housing the target is likewise treachery.
It is accordingly possible to make rough distinctions between treacherous
and non-treacherous acts by irregulars. Treacherous acts violate a target's
belief that those around him pose no threat. Conversely, non-treacherous acts
result in no immediate apprehension of attack beyond those caused by accept-
able military operations. The distinction is roughly analogous to determinations
of whether soldiers may lawfully wear enemy uniforms. For humanitarian
reasons, however, a presumption should be that wearing civilian clothes in
questionable cases in illegal.
3. Identity of the Target, Choice of Weapon, and Necessity and
Proportionality
The previous discussion has focused primarily on the actions of the "assas-
sin" during wartime. As demonstrated earlier, the political motivation for the
attack is relevant in peacetime. Yet there can be no similar criterion for
wartime assassination. The reason for this, as Clausewitz accurately noted, is
that warfare is simply a continuation of politics by other means. Those who
kill to further their side's war effort are thus necessarily politically motivated.
If political motivation makes a killing during wartime an assassination, then
all combat deaths would be assassinations. Clearly, this is not the meaning of
assassination in either common usage or as used in the law of war.
Although the victim's status is relevant in peacetime, it is irrelevant during
war. In a brief but incisive article, Mr. Hays Parks addressed this distinction
in the context of assassination."' His analysis offers an excellent guide for
determining the legitimacy of targeting individuals. That a noncombatant
cannot become the object of attack is undisputed. The prohibition has received
universal recognition under international agreements and law of war manu-
als.5 2 It is a customary norm accepted by the United States in the context
of the Protocol I prohibition on targeting civilians. 153
The confusion arises in treating wrongful killing and assassination as
synonymous. Although every assassination is wrongful, not every wrongful
killing is assassination. Article 148 of General Order 100 protects "a citizen
or a subject of the hostile government," in addition to military personnel."
Similarly, both the Brussels Declaration and the Hague Regulations prohibit
the treacherous murder of "individuals belonging to the hostile nation or
151. Parks, supra note 4, at 6-7.
152. See, e.g., ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, arts. 25, 50; NAvY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 11.2;
Protocol I, supra note 101, arts. 51(2), 57(5).
153. Matheson, supra note 123, at 426.
154. General Order 100, supra note 90, art. 148.
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army.""5 The law of war manuals incorporate the prohibitions in these
terms."5 6 Since these provisions cover civilians, assassination should hold
the same meaning to them as it does for members of the armed forces. In this
respect, a killing must be treacherous before it will be labeled assassination,
regardless of the target's status.
The choice of weapon used to carry out an attack is also irrelevant. In the
law of armed conflict, numerous restrictions apply to the type of weapons.'57
To violate these limitations would be unlawful wholly apart from any ban on
assassination. On the other hand, the use of illegal weapons would not neces-
sarily render an act assassination. It might be argued that some weapons are
treacherous in themselves.' Treachery in the law of assassination, however,
means the breach of confidence in status, not method. In executing an opera-
tion designed to kill a specific individual, planners will be constrained by
international law on the use of certain weapons, but the choice of weapon will
not qualify any act as an assassination.
Similarly, the two major principles governing the use of force, necessity
and proportionality, will restrict types of operations, but they will not affect
determinations of assassination. The principle of necessity requires that any
use of force contribute to the submission of the enemy as quickly as possible
with the minimal expenditure of resources. 59 Within the confines of necessi-
ty, the goal is self-evident: to destroy the enemy's overall ability to wage
war.",° In targeting an individual, necessity would ask: "What will the death
155. Brussels Declaration, supra note 92, art. 13; Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 23(b).
156. See, e.g., ARMY MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 31. Note that the Army manual defines the term
"enemy" to include "every national" of the state with which the United States is at war. Id. art. 25. Thus,
when the comment to Article 31 forbids "outlawry of an enemy," civilians are included within its scope.
157. The prohibitions are both general and specific. The general restriction forbids combatants to
employ weapons likely to cause "unnecessary suffering." E.g., Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 23(e); Protocol
1, supra note 101, art. 35(2); see also BoTHE Er AL., supra note 103, at 197-98 (explaining omission by
Protocol I of prohibitions on specific conventional weapons). Certain weapons and practices have been
incorporated under the general ban by custom, including the use of irregularly shaped bullets, projectiles
filled with glass, bullets coated with substances to inflame wounds, and scored or filed-off bullets. Hague
IV, supra note 7, art. 34(b). Specific restrictions are contained in several international agreements. See,
e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes
Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp. 1907); Convention with
Respect to Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (Supp. 1907); Hague
IV, supra note 7, art. 23(a) (prohibiting use of poison); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980) (Protocol I covers non-detectable fragments;
Protocol II covers mines, booby traps, and other devices; and Protocol III relates to incendiary weapons).
158. The use of poison, for instance, invariably involves treachery.
159. See Am FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 1-3a(1); NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 5.2; ARMY
MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 3; see also The Hostage Case (United States v. List), 11 U.S. Trials of War
Criminals 1253-54 (1950) (describing principle of necessity); MYREs S. McDouoAL & FLoRENTINo P.
FELIcLANO, LAW AND MnwMUM WoRLD PUBLIC ORDER 72, 521-30 (1961); N.C.H. Dunbar, Military
Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 442 (1952).
160. Necessity may be evaluated on two levels. The first level requires that the operation contribute
to the general war effort. Generally, an assassination mission with a military objective meets this require-
ment, since the goal is to defeat the enemy. The second level narrows the scope of the test to require
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of this individual accomplish?" The answer to this question would determine
the legality of the operation. Even if the answer is "absolutely nothing,"
however, the killing may not be assassination. Although illegal under the law
of armed conflict as militarily unnecessary, it will not violate the ban on
assassination in the absence of treachery.
The second general principle governing the use of force, proportionality,
consists of two very closely related requirements."" First, the means selected
to achieve the "necessary" objective must be proportional to the anticipated
military goal. In this sense, proportionality complements the principle of
necessity. More importantly, it expresses the concept of humanity, since by
its terms the destruction and physical suffering caused may not be excessive
in relation to the expected military gain." As with necessity, however,
though a disproportionate operation violates international law, its degree of
proportionality is not relevant to whether the act is an assassination.
4. Guidelines for Understanding Assassination in the Law of Armed
Conflict
Based upon the previous discussion, it is possible to offer the following
guidelines for understanding assassination in the law of armed conflict:
1) Assassination is the treacherous killing of a targeted individual.
2) Treachery involves feigning protected status or financially encouraging
the killing of a specific individual. In particular, military personnel may not
necessity for particular missions. Evaluating compliance with the necessity requirement is clearly more
problematic, particularly with regard to the targeting of individuals.
161. The branches of the United States armed forces differ somewhat in their categorizations of the
general principles governing military operations. The Air Force, for example, speaks in terms of military
necessity, humanity, and chivalry. Humanity is said to be implicitly contained within the category of
necessity; proportionality is characterized as but one component of humanity. AIR FORCE MANUAL, supra
note 19, 1-3a. The Navy does not use the term "military necessity" in the same way and, in fact, labels
the use of the term in the context described above "misleading." NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 5.2
n.5. Instead, the Navy includes its discussion of military necessity in the section on defenses to war crimes.
Id. § S6.2.5.6.2. Further, the Navy does not include a section on humanity, but rather operates along the
traditional lines of necessity, proportionality, and chivalry. Id. § 5.2 and accompanying notes.
162. See AiR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 1-3a(2); see also McDouGAL & FEucLANO, supra
note 159, at 241-44. The Navy Manual describes the principle of proportionality as the following: "The
employment of any kind or degree of force not required for the purpose of the partial or complete
submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources, is prohibited."
NAvY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 5.2.
Obviously, necessity and proportionality are closely related. Perhaps the best way to distinguish them
is to regard necessity as an issue of purpose and proportionality as one of methodology. However, the
principles often will overlap. The principle of proportionality was first codified in Protocol I, supra note
101, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii). These articles prohibit operations that may "be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Id. art. 57(2)(a) (iii). The
language incorporates the principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury.
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wear civilian attire to execute their mission, and though the wearing of enemy
uniforms is generally permissible, it is not legitimate for executing attacks.
3) The standards for irregulars are uncertain. However, given the ratio-
nales underlying the requirement of treachery in assassination, using noncom-
batant status to deceive a target into a false sense of safety probably constitutes
treachery.
4) The distinction between combatants and noncombatants has no bearing
on whether an act is assassination. Nevertheless, operations that target noncom-
batants will almost certainly violate other provisions of the law of armed
conflict.
5) The choice of weapon is not relevant in determining whether an act is
assassination. The use of an unlawful weapon, however, generally will violate
other provisions of the law of armed conflict.
6) The principles of necessity and proportionality will govern operations
targeting individuals. Violation of either principle alone, however, will not
render an act assassination.
V. APPLYING THE PROPER CORPUS OF LAW
As noted in the introduction, in those few instances when scholars have
evaluated the law of assassination, they have tended to apply rather arbitrarily
derived prescriptions to various situations in order to determine whether
targeting specific individuals violates the ban. It should be apparent from the
preceding discussion that this approach is fundamentally flawed. Textual purity
does not drive legality in this area; intentions and techniques do. Nevertheless,
it is possible to posit very generalized conclusions as to which situations are
likely to violate the ban, either under international or domestic law.
A. When the Law of Armed Conflict Governs
The foregoing survey of the legal status of assassination during both
peacetime and wartime is not very useful without a method for determining
when the law of armed conflict governs. This determination turns on whether
the hostilities rise to the level of "armed conflict," and whether the conflict
is of an "international" or "non-international" character. The law of armed
conflict clearly will apply to an armed, international conflict. As a matter of
policy, however, the international/non-international distinction has no bearing
on United States operations, since the United States maintains that the law of
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armed conflict governs hostilities regardless of the characterization of the
conflict. 16
It is generally accepted that internal disturbances are not armed conflict.
The inapplicability of the law of armed conflict to these situations is recognized
implicitly in the Geneva Conventions'" and explicitly in Protocol II there-
to,'65 and also in domestic manuals on the law of war.1 " Internal distur-
bances include riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other related
events, such as mass arrests.167 At the other end of the continuum, military
engagement between the forces of two states is universally regarded as armed
conflict. Classifying the grey areas-guerilla warfare or operations designed
to combat terrorism-is more difficult. Although this issue is beyond the scope
of this article,168 it is critical in determining the applicable law of assassina-
tion. Due to the uncertainty in determining delimitation lines, the decision
163. Dep't of Defense, Law of War Program (DoD Dir. 5200.77), Nov. 5, 1974, para. V.A. The
international/non-international conflict distinction does apply to other states. For example, Protocol I applies
only to international armed conflicts, whereas Protocol II covers all armed conflict. Protocol 1, supra note
101, art. 1; Protocol H, supra note 101, art. 1. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions, with the exception
of their common Article 3, apply only to international conflicts. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Convention on Wounded Armed Forces]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Sea Convention on Wounded Armed Forces];
Geneva III, supra note 133; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention on Civilian Persons].
Additionally, Hague IV contains a general participation clause, although the Nuremberg Tribunal later
deemed the convention to be customary law. Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 2.
164. These conventions contain identical language in Article 3. See Convention on Wounded Armed
Forces, supra note 163, art. 3; Sea Convention on Wounded Armed Forces, supra note 163, art. 3; Geneva
III, supra note 133, art 3; Convention on Civilian Persons, supra note 163, art 3.
165. Protocol II, supra note 101, art. 1(2).
166. See, e.g., NAVY MANUAL, supra note 19, § 5.1 n.3.
167. INTERNATIONAL CoMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFr ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF AUGUST 12, 1949, at 133 (1973).
168. In the absence of contextually specific legal analysis, the following factors are relevant in
determining whether the targeting of a specific individual will implicate the law of armed conflict:
1) The law of assassination, whether existing under the law of armed conflict or not, does
not depend on right and wrong. It involves rules of conduct, not rules for allocating
blame. Thus, in deciding whether the law of armed conflict is applicable, issues such
as unlawful aggression are not relevant.
2) The relevant situation is more likely to be deemed armed conflict the greater the:
a) degree of international involvement or extent of international effect;
b) organized character of the competing sides;
c) extent of violence;
d) similarity of the combat to traditional military operations;
e) systematic (as opposed to sporadic) nature of the violence; and
f) fundamental nature of the grievances.
Each of these factors moves the conflict away from the internal disturbances category cited in Protocol II
and toward the law of armed conflict.
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ultimately must be made at the policy level, with a presumption in favor of
armed conflict to maximize humanitarian protections.169
Sometimes it will not matter which corpus of law governing assassination
applies. For example, targeting a noncombatant in an armed conflict is illegal,
regardless of whether treachery is used. On the other hand, if the hostilities
do not rise to the level of an armed conflict, then targeting an individual who
would qualify as a noncombatant during armed conflict will, if politically
motivated, constitute assassination. Similarly, targeting someone meeting the
criteria of a combatant in armed conflict, but whose death is not "necessary,"
would be illegal. If it is not necessary in armed conflict, then short of armed
conflict, the killing would probably be either political, and thus assassination,
or random, and thus murder.
Peacetime targeting of an individual qualifying as a combatant in armed
conflict presents a dilemma. Is such targeting acceptable since it is analogous
to wartime killing? Characterizing the conflict in this situation assumes political
overtones, since a politically motivated killing in the absence of armed conflict
would expose the targeting state to accusations of engaging in assassination.
The best approach is to shift the focus from the level of conflict to the justifi-
cation for the action. If the targeting state can justify the use of force under
international law, and the targeted individual is engaged in an activity that
would make him a combatant during armed conflict, then specifically directing
an attack against him is acceptable.
An obvious example is combatting terrorism. Whether terrorism amounts
to armed conflict is disputable. If it does, then states can engage terrorists
directly and individually. Even if it does not, states have a generally recog-
nized right of self-defense under international law, acknowledged in the U.N.
Charter. 70 Thus, if the targeted individual engages in activity that would
qualify him as a combatant during an armed conflict, attacking him is legal.
In summary, three phases of conflict require determinations of applicable
law. In situations of internal disturbances, the law of armed conflict does not
apply; determinations of assassination will depend on political motivations. At
the other end of the spectrum are situations that clearly constitute armed
conflict. The grey area between the extremes is more problematic. Other legal
provisions covering related grounds, however, may alleviate the difficulty of
determining assassination. The one exception involves individuals who would
be legal targets in armed conflict. Yet the uncertainty involved in grey-area
situations makes it advisable to focus on the legal rationale underlying the
operation in deciding whether to target individuals.
169. For an analysis of the applicability of the law of armed conflict to a "grey area" case, see W.
Michael Reisman & James Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 459
(1988).
170. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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B. State-Sponsored Killings as Self-Defense
In the aftermath of World War II's devastation, a consensus emerged
among the community of nations that law had to take a more active role in
preventing the outbreak of war, rather than simply regulating its conduct. This
principle was recognized in the development of the International Military
Tribunals,"' and it was enshrined in the constitution designed to fashion the
new world order, the United Nations Charter. The central provision, Article
2(4), reads as follows: "All members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.""7 Additional constitutive, prescriptive, and
hortatory declarations have echoed this principle."7 The architects of the
United Nations designed the Security Council, representing the world's five
major military powers, to enforce the norm.' 4 At the same time, states rec-
ognized that effectively prohibiting the wrongful use of force was a still-distant
goal. Therefore, they preserved the right to self-defense in Article 51 of the
new Charter. 75 Numerous international agreements have reaffirmed this right
of self-defense since ratification of the U.N. Charter.'76
When targeting a specific individual is based on a valid exercise of self-
defense, killing that individual will rarely be considered assassination, regard-
less of the applicable law governing assassination. The international law of
armed conflict will likely be deemed applicable. Self-defense as envisaged by
the U.N. Charter is justified only in response to an armed attack.'" Hostili-
ties activating Article 51 would almost certainly rise to the level of "armed
conflict." When hostilities fall within this category, the political motivation
criterion is suspended and the issue becomes whether the killing was treacher-
ous. In other words, the legality of killing is self-defense depends on how the
individual is killed, and not on the specific motivation for the killing.
171. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(a), annexed to Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 39 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 260 (Supp. 1945).
172. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
173. See, e.g., Rio Treaty, supra note 50, art. 1; Declaration on Principles, supra note 51, pmbl.
& princ. 1; Definition ofAggression, supra note 52, art. 1.
174. See U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
175. Id. art. 51.
176. See, e.g., Rio Treaty, supra note 50, art. 3; Declaration of Principles, supra note 53, princ.
1; North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Oct. 10, 1955, art. 4, 219 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Warsaw Pact].
177. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. For a narrow reading of the phrase "armed attack,* see Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 93-94 (June 27). In this case, the International Court
of Justice held that the provision of weapons or logistical or other support did not amount to "armed attack"
as envisioned in the Charter. I. Therefore, U.S. activities against Nicaragua were not justified as collective
self-defense.
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C. State-Sponsored Killing as Anticipatory Self-Defense
Specifically targeting individuals in self-defense is not legally controversial.
The controversy arises over the definition of self-defense. For example, the
legal status of preemptive attacks as a form of self-defense remains uncertain.
Anticipatory self-defense, however, serves an important deterrent function.
Striking the first blow is often critical in military operations. The right to
anticipatory self-defense makes the benefits of aggression less certain and less
appealing.
Despite these arguments, a number of reputable scholars have maintained
that an attack must actually occur before Article 51 becomes operative. 178
They generally base this assertion on the argument that the original Charter
signatories intended to supplant customary self-defense norms and rely on new
U.N. enforcement mechanisms for maintaining peace in an effort to minimize
the overall use of force. Assuming that an aggressor violated the new prescrip-
tion against the use of force, the combined might of the U.N. forces could
dislodge and defeat him. The Charter security regime never materialized, at
least not until very recently. Caught in the grip of the Cold War rivalry, the
Security Council was rendered essentially impotent, thereby resulting in a
broader use of Article 51.
If anticipatory self-defense is justifiable, should the specific targeting of
an individual for defensive reasons likewise be acceptable as a matter of law?
Can, for example, a state under threat of attack target the enemy's high
command as the first blow in its preemptive strike? To complicate the hypo-
thetical, assume that the strike alone would dissuade the (initial) aggressor or
avert the once-imminent attack. Here, the killing would be the goal of the
operation, not just a component in a larger general plan. The hypothetical
presents an extreme case, but the preemptive strike certainly would be legiti-
mate. The mere fact that a state strikes the first blow, indeed the only blow,
does not alone render the act political if it is otherwise in self-defense. Further,
if the situation is deemed to be armed conflict, then the only issue as to
assassination is whether treachery was a component of the plan.
1. The Issue of Imminence
Assuming that anticipatory self-defense does justify individual targeting,
the next issue involves timing. The prevalent view of anticipatory defense
maintains that the attack must be "imminent." Secretary of State Daniel
Webster provided the classic articulation of this standard during the famous
178. See, e.g., Gamal M. Badr, The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility, 10
GA. J. INT'I & COm?. L. 1, 21-25 (1980); Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article
51 ofthe Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 877 (1947).
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Caroline incident in the nineteenth century. According to Webster, self-defense
should "be confined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."'79 Preparation alone is insufficient. The Nuremberg Tribunal
later spoke approvingly of this principle."' 0
Determining the standard of imminence is critical. Should an attack itself
be imminent before the right to self-defense vests? Or does imminence imply
something other than the actual timing of the strike? Some believe in a high
standard for imminence, reading the Caroline principle narrowly.' A con-
textual analysis of each situation with the Charter and international law is
necessary before coming to any definitive conclusions. Some cases support
viewing the requirement as temporal, relating to the precise timing of the
preemptive attack. For example, when a weaker state is threatening a stronger
one, or when equal states threaten each other and the potential victim has time
to take defensive measures, it is reasonable to require a state to hold off
preemptive actions until the last minute, so as to allow the maximum time for
peaceful resolution of the dispute. The preference in international law for
nonviolent resolutions supports such a requirement. Yet internatJonal law does
not require states to risk destruction simply to allow possibly fruitless negotia-
tions to continue. That international law even recognizes the principle of
anticipatory self-defense illustrates this point. In such cases, the general rule
against resorting to force yields to state rights to self-defense.
Based on this analysis, imminence is a relative criterion. As defensive
options become more limited or less likely to succeed, the acceptability of
preemptive action increases. A weak state may be justified in acting sooner
than a stronger one when facing an identical threat simply because it is at
greater risk in having to wait. The greater the relative threat, the more likely
preemptive actions are to be effective, and, therefore, the greater the justifica-
tion for acting before the enemy can complete preparations and mount its
aggressive attack.
However, this type of analysis breaks down in considering unconventional
hostilities such as terrorism. The United States, for example, is much stronger
than any terrorist group. By the criteria set forth above, the law should require
the United States to wait to react until the last moment before being attacked.
179. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in Moore, DIGEST 411,
412 (emphasis added). The Caroline incident involved a Canadian insurrection in 1837. After being
defeated, the insurgents retreated into the United States where they recruited and planned further operations.
The Caroline was being used by the rebels. British troops crossed the border and destroyed the vessel.
Britain justified the action on the grounds that the United States was not enforcing its laws along the frontier
and that the action was a legitimate exercise of self-defense. 2 Moore DIGEST, supra, at 409-11.
180. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172,
205 (1947).
181. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1620,
1634-35 (1984).
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Even without thd possibility of successful negotiations, waiting will neverthe-
less give law enforcement operations more time to work. Thus, waiting
furthers the purpose of avoiding resort to force.
The nature of terrorist attacks, however, frustrates this analysis. Regardless
of the relative strength of the terrorist group, a state that hesitates to act against
terrorists may lose the opportunity to act at all. Terrorists are difficult to locate
and to track. Moreover, since most operations generally are very secretive,
particularly regarding the intended target, a state may not be able to mobilize
reliable defenses for all potential locations of attack. Effectively protecting all
U.S. assets in Europe, for example, would be a task of insurmountable propor-
tions.
Thus, targeted states generally have only a limited "window of opportuni-
ty." Unless international law requires the potential victim simply to suffer the
attack, the proper standard for evaluating an anticipatory operation must be
whether or not it occurred during the last possible window of opportunity.
Hence, the appropriate question relates more to the correct timing of the
preemptive strike than to the imminence of the attack that animates it. Antici-
patory self-defense is meaningless without this standard.
2. Evaluating the Threat to the State
What if the threat lacks specificity? Assume, for instance, that a state's
intelligence sources have located the leaders of a particular hostile terrorist
group at a place vulnerable to attack, but that reports indicate no specific future
plans for terrorist acts. Can the state target these individuals? The state would
place its citizens at risk by taking no preemptive action. Yet attacking the
group in the absence of a current threat has strong political overtones and may
be deemed assassination under the operational code.
The best solution is to avoid the either/or approach and instead focus on
the likelihood of future attacks. This approach would comport with the doctrine
of anticipatory self-defense in traditional situations. States seldom possess the
war plans of their enemy to indicate the details of an imminent attack. Circum-
stantial evidence of intent may be sufficient, assuming acceptance of the
anticipatory self-defense doctrine, to justify action. This is a subjective deter-
mination made by the potential victim, and the resulting preemptive operation
also would be evaluated subjectively.
Of course, the indicia of terrorist attack will not necessarily match those
in more traditional military operations. Terrorists do not mobilize reserves,
cancel leaves, or mass forces. Nevertheless, some reliable indications can
predict forthcoming attacks. States should not be prevented from acting in self-
defense by targeting individual terrorists simply because the mode of conflict
exists on a different level. Although specific indicators of attack are best left
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to intelligence experts, from a legal perspective four factors are particularly
relevant in determining the reasonableness of a belief that the state will be
attacked:
a) Past Practices: Past practices of the terrorist organization must be
reviewed to determine the extent to which a possible attack is consistent with
those practices. Does a pause usually occur between attacks? If so, the fact
that a prior attack has not recently occurred will not indicate that terrorist
activities have stopped. On the other hand, if the particular group has been
engaged in a nearly continuous stream of violence, a lull in that violence
argues against the reasonableness of a preemptive strike.
b) Motives: Does the group have articulated goals? If so, then the extent
to which those goals have or have not been fulfilled will bear on the likelihood
of future attacks. To what extent does the group have goals suggesting a long-
term conflict with the target state?
c) Current Context: Have contemporary events caused tensions between
the state and the terrorists to become exacerbated or relaxed? Similarly, what
is the current state of relations between the target state and those nations
sponsoring the terrorist group? Further, to what extent is the target state
currently vulnerable from either a security or political perspective?
d) Preparatory Actions: Even though no intelligence is available indicating
a planned attack, are activities underway that suggest that an operation is being
planned? For example, has the group recently received weapons, made contact
with sponsors, or dispersed its operatives? The more consistent the particular
activities that the group conducts are with prior operations, the more likely a
response is to be deemed reasonable.
Assuming that a state concludes that a terrorist attack can reasonably be
expected, individual terrorists would then become subject to targeting. If the
terrorist group has never acted against the state, the analysis set forth above
for anticipatory self-defense will apply. However, assume that the group has
committed terrorism against the state and is expected to do so again in the
future. In this scenario, the timing of the preemptive action relative to the
expected attack is irrelevant, since the various terrorist acts may be regarded
as part of a continuous operation. This characterization is analogous to the
battle/war distinction. Once war has commenced, the initiation of each battle
is not evaluated separately. The war may be aggressive under international
law, but the battles per se would not. The same reasoning applies to terrorism.
The situation is one of self-defense, not anticipatory self-defense. A tactic of
targeting individuals merits no deviation from this general rule.
In summary, a state generally may target those reasonably believed to
represent a violent threat to it. If the attack has not occurred, the right to act
anticipate the attack arises at the point at which the threat can last be thwarted
effectively. On the other hand, if the attack is continuing, the timing of the
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defensive action is irrelevant. It must be emphasized, however, that the
previous discussion bears on the issue of assassination only with regard to the
likelihood that a killing might indicate political motivation in non-armed-
conflict circumstances. To the extent an action does not meet the standards of
self-defense, it might be politically motivated, and therefore might be assassina-
tion. If the action is a valid exercise of self-defense, it is not (legally) political-
ly motivated. Additionally, if an act in self-defense rises to the level of armed
conflict, the only issue as to assassination is treachery.
D. Determining Political Motivation of State-Sponsored Killing in
Non-Defensive Situations
Whether non-defensive use of force against specific individuals is assassi-
nation is less certain. Under the law of armed conflict, the determination turns
on the mechanics of each military operation. In peacetime, though, the self-
defense analysis is instructive. The greater the acceptability of the use of force
under international law, the less likely is the use of force to be deemed politi-
cally motivated. Self-defense is a good example, since it is widely regarded
in the world community as legitimate. On the other hand, however, the less
accepted a justification in the world community, the more suspect the opera-
tion.
For instance, consider the targeting of a drug lord overseas. Despite the
real threat of illegal drugs to states, drug imports do not constitute an armed
attack as traditionally understood under the doctrine of self-defense. Perhaps
a new variant of the self-defense doctrine can focus on the effects rather than
the mode of the activity. Drugs obviously kill more Americans every year than
terrorism, and drug lords are aware of the deadly nature of their trade. The
argument may be compelling, but it has no basis in international law. Anti-
drug operations involving individual targeting would likely be regarded as
political, not as traditional self-defense actions.
The case of humanitarian intervention illustrates best the methods that states
use to ascribe political motivations to uses of force. Numerous scholars and
nations maintain that such intervention is impermissible."' The general argu-
ment contends that all intervention using force will have political features.'83
182. See, e.g., RICHARD J. ERICKSoN, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILrARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPON-
SoRED TERRORISM 188-93 (1989); Schachter, supra note 181, at 1629; Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 218 (John N. Moore ed., 1974); Thomas
N. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, AfterBangladesh: The Law ofHunanitarian Intervention by Military Force,
67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
183. This view maintains that to the extent humanitarian intervention was permissible prior to 1945,
U.N. Charter Article 2(4) put the doctrine to rest. This highlights the concern over political motivation,
for the article outlaws the use of force against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any




The rule against intervention, however, should not be extended to allow a state
to abuse its citizens; the purpose of the rule is simply to prevent other states
with Mn motives from interfering. From a world order perspective, this ap-
proach is unacceptable. Its proponents fail to recognize that law is ultimately
a balancing of interests. As a general rule a presumption against intervention
makes sense, but surely that presumption is rebuttable in extreme cases. As
Professor Reisman has argued:
The advent of the United Nations neither terminated nor weakened the customary
institution of humanitarian intervention. In terms of its substantive marrow, the
Charter strengthened and extended humanitarian intervention, in that it confirmed
the homocentric character of international law and set in motion a continuous
authoritative process of articulating international human rights, reporting and
deciding infractions, assessing the degree of aggregate realization of human rights,
and appraising its own works."'
The strengthening of human rights norms since ratification of the Charter has
enhanced the purposes expressed therein."i 5 Nevertheless, those who advo-
cate humanitarian intervention under international law recognize that it is a
doctrine liable to abuse."i 6 Accordingly, most proponents condition their
support by requiring that intervention be free of political motivation. Interven-
tion must be narrow in scope and limited in purpose, and it must comport with
all international prescriptions governing the use of force. Unilateral humanitari-
an intervention is particularly suspect, and states not acting under the auspices
of the United Nations or regional organizations must accordingly bear a higher
standard of proof regarding their intentions." s Some writers even argue that
no political benefits may accrue to the intervening state."'
Under both approaches, the political factor looms large, and individual
targeting will always receive much scrutiny. The acceptance of forceful
intervention for humanitarian purposes demonstrates that targeting particular
individuals may not, in certain circumstances, amount to assassination. The
184. W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the lbos, in HUMANrrARAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167 (Robert Lillich ed., 1973) [hereinafter Reisman, Humani-
tarian Intervention]. For additional arguments that humanitarian intervention is legal under international
law, see MANOUCHEHR GANn, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RiGHTs (1962); FERNANDO R.
TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALrrY (1988).
185. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), art. 4, 21 I.L.M.
58 (1982) ("Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and
the integrity of his person.'); AmericanDeclaration of theRights andDuties of Man, supra note 54 ("Every
human being has the right to life, liberty and security of his person."); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 54 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."). Of particular
importance is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 54.
186. The presumption in international law against intervention implicitly reflects concerns over abuse
of force. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 4, 106-10 (June 27).
187. Reisman, Hunanitarian Intervention, supra note 184, at 193.
188. BARBARA HARFF, GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTs: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLIrICAL
ISSUES (University of Denver Grad. School of Int'l Stud. Monograph Series in World Affairs vol. 20:3,
1984).
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assertion presumes that hostilities between the intervenor and the offending
state are underway or inevitable. If hostilities are underway, norms of the law
of armed conflict will apply. If they are merely anticipated, however, targeting
will be acceptable only in the absence of political motivations. Since the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention lacks universal support, targeted killings
run a high risk of being labeled assassination.
Policymakers and planners must be very sensitive to the factors outlined
above. In a classic armed conflict, individual targeting is less an issue of
assassination than it is of determining the lawful target. A similar conclusion
results in a traditional self-defense operation following an aggressive attack.
However, most states intending to target an individual usually act first.
Their initial use of force is less likely to be evaluated by the standards of
armed conflict and more likely to be judged as politically motivated. Conse-
quently, as the acceptability of the use of force becomes less certain under
international law, individual targeting becomes the subject of increasing
controversy.
VI. DOMESTIc PROHIBITIONS
The United States is bound by domestic as well as international prohibitions
of assassination. These domestic restrictions are promulgated by the Executive
Branch. Executive Order 12,333, the current directive, is the third since 1976.
It provides that "[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the United
States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination"
and that "[n]o agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or
request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order."'
This seemingly straightforward instruction is replete with uncertainty. What
precisely does assassination mean? Does the term focus on the motive or the
method of an act? What potential targets does it protect? What constitutes
participation? Would aiding a coup that might result in the death of the over-
thrown leader be prohibited, or does the executive order apply only to situa-
tions where the leader's death is an explicit objective?
Executive Order 12,333 itself offers little guidance on these questions.
Unlike legislation, the order contains no definitional section. The sections cited
above are the only ones that mention assassination in Executive Order 12,333,
a lengthy document that addresses the broader subject of constraints on intelli-
gence agencies. Dispelling the order's uncertainty requires a review of the
context in which it arose. The motives for its promulgation may suggest the
scope of the prohibition. In addition, analyzing the order's past application will





yield insights as to its current role in the operational code-its meaning has
possibly evolved over time.
A. The Church Committee Investigations
The domestic ban on assassination can be traced to the congressional
investigations conducted in the mid-1970s into CIA activities. 9  These hear-
ings resulted from revelations that the Agency had engaged in rather sinister
operations in the past, particularly in the 1960s. These questionable operations
included encouragement and direct participation in assassination attempts.
Under the guidance of Senator Frank Church, the Senate Select Committee to
Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the
Church Committee) explored the American intelligence community's involve-
ment in assassination. Its work culminated in a comprehensive report.19'
The Committee investigated five operations at length. Since exploring the
nature of the activities revealed to the public will help explain the rationale
behind the executive orders, a brief review of the operations is appropri-
ate. 192
1. Patrice Lumumba
In the fall of 1960, the CIA began plotting against Patrice Lumumba,
Premier of the newly independent Congo (Zaire). The country was then
embroiled in a civil war with Cold War implications. "S President Eisenhow-
er expressed his concern over the situation in the Congo, particularly over
190. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pts. 1-6 (1975-76); Intelligence Activities-Senate Res. 21: Hearings
Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., vols. 1-7 (1975).
191. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, AN INTERIM REPORT OF THE
SENATE SELECT COmmTE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) [hereinafter CHURCH REPORT].
192. In addition to the operations discussed in the text, evidence suggests that the CIA considered the
assassination of President Sukarno of Indonesia. However, the planning got only as far as identifying a
potential assassin. The Agency also provided arms to opponents of 'Papa Doc" Duvalier in Haiti. Although
it planned no assassination, the CIA understood that the Haitian leader might be killed in the coup attempt.
Id. at 4 n.1.
193. There was concern that Lumumba might be a leftist. The Leopoldville station chief expressed
this concern in a cable to the CIA Director:
Embassy and station believe Congo experiencing classic communist effort takeover government.
Many forces at work here: Soviets... Communist Party, etc. Although difficult determine major
influencing factors to predict outcome struggle for power, decisive period not far off. Whether
or not Lumumba actually commie or just playing commie game to assist his solidifying power,
anti-West forces rapidly increasing power Congo and there may be little time left in which [sic]
take action to avoid another Cuba.
Cable from Leopoldville CIA Station Chief to Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence (Aug. 18,
1960), reprinted in CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 14.
Yale Journal of International Law
Lumumba, at a National Security Council meeting in August. Allen Dulles,
the Director of Central Intelligence, took those comments as authority to plan
and carry out Lumumba's assassination, though it is not certain that President
Eisenhower actually intended this result.194
Soon thereafter, the CIA station chief in Leopoldville initiated discussions
with an individual selected to infiltrate Lumumba's entourage. Among the
methods contemplated for killing Lumumba was the use of a biological poison
that could be placed in food or toothpaste. The CIA sent poisons to the Congo
and took some initial steps to gain access to Lumumba. Before the assassina-
tion attempt was executed, however, a rival Congolese faction killed Lumum-
ba.' 9' Interestingly, United Nations peacekeeping forces were in the country
trying to reestablish order during the planning of the assassination, and at one
point Lumumba actually sought refuge with U.N. troops.1 96 Nevertheless,
the assassination plot proceeded.' 97
2. Fidel Castro
The CIA was involved in a minimum of eight plots to assassinate Cuban
dictator Fidel Castro between 1960 and 1965.198 In an early attempt, the CIA
retained a Cuban to "arrange an accident" in exchange for $10,000 and a
promise to educate his son in the event he died during the operation. The
scheme dissolved when the Cuban reported that the opportunity to execute his
plan never materialized. A second effort to kill Castro involved cigars treated
with a powerful botulinum toxin. The cigars were prepared and delivered to
Cuba, but it is not certain that CIA agents ever tried to get Castro to smoke
one. 199
These early failures prompted the CIA to hire professionals. It contacted
underworld figure John Rosselli, who agreed to help assassinate Castro.20°
194. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 13. However, some testimony contradicted the conclusion
that Eisenhower desired the assassination of Lumumba. Id. Nevertheless, it is clear that Dulles did desire
the assassination. Id. at 52.
195. Id. at 4, 28.
196. For a discussion of the U.N. operation, see U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., THE BLUE HBLMETs:
A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING 215-17 (1985).
197. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 30.
198. The operations against Castro actually began with efforts to humiliate him publicly, not with
assassination plots. The CIA mounted an operation to diminish his stature by embarrassing him during
public speeches. One plan involved spraying his broadcasting studio with a chemical similar to LSD, but
it fell through when the drug proved unreliable. Another involved filling cigars with a disorienting drug
in the hope that Castro would smoke one prior to delivering a speech. Probably the most creative plot called
for dusting his shoes with a strong depilatory at a hotel during a trip abroad. The chemical would cause
his beard to fall out, thus destroying his image as "The Beard." The plot collapsed when Castro canceled
his trip. Id. at 72.
199. Id. at 73.
200. According to testimony, Rosselli was 'very hesitant about participating in the project," but finally
agreed to because he felt he had "an obligation to his government.' Id. at 76.
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The Technical Services Division at the CIA subsequently prepared dissolving
poison pills for Rosselli which were to be placed in Castro's drink by a highly
placed Cuban official with gambling debts owed to Rosselli. This operation
failed when the official lost his governmental position, and thus his access to
the Cuban leader. A later plan to employ the poison at a restaurant was foiled
when Castro stopped frequenting the locale.2"1
At this point, the Bay of Pigs invasion intervened. Despite the operation's
failure, efforts to kill Castro were subsequently redoubled. The Agency again
formulated plans for poisoning him, but none came to fruition. Frustrated, the
CIA reached new heights of creativity-and absurdity. In 1963 two incredible
plots were concocted. In one, an exotic seashell was rigged to explode as
Castro, a devoted diver, swam over it. The CIA eventually rejected that plot
as "impractical." In another plan, the Technical Services Division treated a
diving suit with a fungus that would cause a chronic skin disease. As an added
measure, the regulator was contaminated with tubercula bacillus. Other plots
involved high-powered rifles and a ball point pen rigged with a hypodermic
needle so fine that the victim would be unaware of penetration. All failed.'
Ultimately, the Church Committee found insufficient evidence to implicate
the Presidents in power during the operations-Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson. It remains unclear whether the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen
Dulles, knew of the plots, although some evidence suggests that he did.
Apparently, his successor, John McCone, did not. The efforts were not
renegade operations, however, for other senior CIA officials, including the
Deputy Director for Plans, knew of and approved the plans.2"
3. Rafael Trujillo
Both the Kennedy and the Eisenhower administrations opposed Rafael
Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, fearing that his policies would
result in a revolution like Cuba's. The United States supported a dissident
group that hoped to overthrow Trujillo, and which the U.S. government
officials knew intended to assassinate him. The United States provided arms
to the group that subsequently assassinated Trujillo.'
The Church Committee never established whether the CIA supplied the
arms with the knowledge that they would be used in an assassination attempt.
Nor did the Committee determine whether the arms were actually used in
201. Il at 80-82.
202. IL at 84-86. The diving suit was to be given to Castro by James Donovan. At the time, Donovan
was negotiating with the Cubans for release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. The CIA abandoned the plan when
it learned that Donovan had already given Castro a wet suit. Id. at 85-86.
203. Id. at 263-64.
204. Id. at 191-215.
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killing Trujillo in May 1961. However, the day before Trujillo's death, a cable
personally authorized by Kennedy was sent to the American Consul General
in the Dominican Republic specifically stating that United States policy did not
condone political assassination. On the other hand, the cable indicated that the
United States continued to support the opposition group. 205
4. Ngo Dihn Diem
In November 1963, President Ngo Dihn Diem of South Vietnam was killed
during a military coup. The United States, which supported the coup, had
earlier been approached by one of the plotters concerning the possibility of
using assassination to force a change in the regime. 6 In a cable to the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, the Saigon Station Chief supported the idea,
stating that the alternative was "either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted
struggle which would rip the Army and the country assunder [sic]." 2" Direc-
tor McCone responded that the United States could not "be in the position of
stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination,.., thereby engaging our
responsibility therefor." '"0 This message was passed to the coup plotters,
who replied "alright, you don't like it, we won't talk about it anymore.""0
The Church Committee found that although the United States supported the
coup resulting in Diem's death, the United States had no involvement in the
killing. 210
5. General Ren6 Schneider
In September 1970, Salvador Allende Gossens, perceived by the United
States as a leftist, won a plurality in the Chilean presidential elections. Because
205. Id. at 191.
206. Id. at 217.
207. Cable from CIA Saigon Station Chief to John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence (Oct.
5, 1963), reprinted in id. at 217.
208. There were actually two cables: one on October 5, 1963 and one on October 6, 1963. The first
cable best expresses McCone's views on assassination:
[We certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination,
but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we
might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We
believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of
our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is
hands off. However, we naturally interested [sic] in intelligence on any such plan.
Cable from CIA Saigon Station Chief to John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence (Oct. 5, 1963),
reprinted in CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 217.
The position taken is practical, not legal. Nevertheless, the cable indicates CIA recognition that
assassination was in some sense wrongful. Although the cable forbids United States participation in
assassination attempts, it condones supporting coups in which assassination may result.
209. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 221.
210. Id. at 217.
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he had not secured a majority, the Chilean Congress was constitutionally
charged with selecting the president from the top two finishers. In the past,
the Congress had always selected the candidate who garnered the plurality of
votes. Faced with the prospect of Allende's ascension to power, the United
States began actively fomenting a military coup."'
General Schneider, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean armed forces,
frustrated the United States coup efforts. Although he was not an Allende
supporter, General Schneider was a strict constitutionalist who opposed
military coups generally. Therefore, if the coup was to be successful,
Schneider had to be removed. Plotters ultimately made three attempts to kidnap
the general. During the botched third attempt, Schneider was killed. Although
the Church Committee determined that the role of the United States in the coup
attempts was substantial, it concluded that no United States official authorized
the assassination of General Schneider. 21
2
6.. Findings of the Church Committee
The Church Committee Report concluded with findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. Since the executive orders partly resulted from the investiga-
tion, the committee findings should be reviewed.
The Committee made essentially three findings: 1) Due to a breakdown in
the CIA's command and control structure, it was possible to mount assassi-
nation plots without express authorization; 2) Many of the officials involved
in the plots believed them to be permissible; 3) Communication broke down
between those in charge of the plots and their superiors. This breakdown
resulted not only from the failure of action officers to keep their superiors
informed, but also from the failure of superiors to make clear that assassination
was an impermissible instrument of foreign policy. 213In short, the communicative process within the agency was in disarray.
Those in charge of the operations did not know what boundaries they were
required to work within, and their superiors made no effort to guide them.
Thus, while none of the operations reviewed was alone renegade, in a sense,
the entire agency was. Thus, one likely motivation for the executive orders
was to remedy the confusion over the U.S. assassination policy.
211. Id. at 225. In September 1970, President Nixon told D.C.I. Helms that Allende was unacceptable
and instructed him to organize a military coup to block his accession to power. The United States
government provided the coup plotters with financial aid, machine guns, and other equipment. Id. at 225-
27.
212. Id. at 262. Director Helms indicated that under his command the CIA would not engage in
assassination. He testified that "when I became Director, I had already made up my mind that we weren't
going to have any of that business when I was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows. ..
Id. at 228.
213. Id. at 261-67.
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The Church Report also reached conclusions on policy matters that are
valuable in understanding the genesis of the current prohibitions. The Commit-
tee argued that assassination is impractical, and that it violates the "moral
precepts fundamental to our way of life. ,214 Moreover, assassination under-
mines the confidence of the American public in its government. 215 Therefore,
assassination was not an acceptable tool of U.S. foreign policy, even in the
context of the Cold War.
However, the Committee intimated that not every operation resulting in
the death of a foreign official constitutes complicity in assassination. In dis-
cussing coups, for instance, it stated that "[t]he possibility of assassination...
is one of the issues to be considered in determining the propriety of United
States involvement ... , particularly where the assassination of a foreign
leader is a likely prospect. " 216 This statement suggests that the Committee
opposed prohibiting U.S. involvement in a coup when assassination is merely
a possibility. Of course, the comment also supports prohibiting involvement
when assassination is aprobability. Additionally, it suggests that an act is more
likely to constitute assassination the more highly placed the target. This view
implies a political aspect to the Committee's understanding of assassination
similar to that in international law.
The Committee's analysis of the five incidents provides further support for
this conclusion. In the Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider affairs, each target died
in a U.S.-supported coup attempt. However, the Committee emphasized that
in none of the cases was the United States directly involved in the actual
assassination.217 The strongest condemnation went to the Castro and Lumum-
ba operations, in which the death of the leaders was an acknowledged CIA
goal.
Second, the Committee retreated from its conclusion that the Cold War did
not merit U.S. involvement in assassination plots by noting that none of them
involved an imminent danger to the United States. It stated that of the five
cases studied, only Castro posed a physical danger to the country, and then
only during the Cuban missile crisis. These comments suggest that in
situations of imminent physical danger to the United States, it might be accept-
able to target an individual.
Finally, the Committee framed its concern about assassination undermining
public confidence in the government in terms of an operation "almost inevita-
214. Id. at 257.
215. Id. at 258.
216. Id.
217. Note that in the Diem and Schneider affairs, the D.C.I. specifically instructed subordinates not
to participate in assassination attempts. In the latter case, the instruction assumed the aura of organizational
policy. Thus, the agency had generally rejected the excesses of the Lumumba and Castro operations by
the time of these affairs.




bly becoming known."219 This suggests that clandestine or covert operations
leading to killings carry the greater political liability of being characterized as
assassination. Therefore, overt operations are less likely to be viewed by the
public as assassinations.
Perhaps the best clue to the Committee's understanding of permissible
actions can be seen in the legislation it proposed. The Committee was con-
cerned that promulgated assassination policies would be subject to change as
administrations and senior officials were replaced. It was also concerned that
while current law made it a crime to kill or conspire to kill a foreign official
while in the United States,' 0 no complementary ban prohibited acts occur-
ring beyond national borders. A statutory ban on assassination would serve to
cure both of these problems.
The proposed statute is particularly interesting for what it does and does
not outlaw. It prohibits killing a foreign official because of his "political views,
actions, or statements.""s This provision limits the prohibition to politically
motivated actions. The comments accompanying the proposed statute make
clear that the term "political" modifies "views, actions, and statements," not
simply the word "views.t"I The proposed statute thus treats assassination
in a manner similar to international law, and it does not clearly prohibit non-
political killings.
The proposed statute also defines the phrase "foreign official" broadly in
terms of governmental position. Virtually all officials or representatives of a
foreign government are protected by the statute, as are those of a "foreign
political group, party, military force, movement or other association." I The
Committee included the latter categories because it recognized that individuals
219. Id.
220. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1117 (1988).
221. The proposed statute explicitly directs that:
Whoever being an officer or employee of the United States, while outside the United States and
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, kills any foreign official,
because of such official's political views, actions or statements, while such official is outside the
United States and such jurisdiction, shall be punished as provided.
Proposed Statute, in CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, app. A, § 1118(d). The proposed statute also
prohibited conspiracy and attempted assassination. Id. § 1118(a)-(c).
222. *Killing, attempting to kill, or conspiring to kill would be punishable under the statute only if
it were politically motivated. Political motivation would encompass the acts against foreign officials because
of their political views, actions, or statements." Id. at 283 cmt.
223. The proposed statute states:
As used in this section, the term "foreign* official means a Chief of State, or the political
equivalent, President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Premier, Foreign Minister, Ambassador,
or other officer, employee, or agent; (a) of a foreign government with which the United States
is not at war pursuant to a declaration of war or against which the United States Armed Forces
have not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of the War
Powers Resolution; or (b) of a foreign political group, party, military force, movement or other
association with which the United States is not at war ... ; or (c) of an international organiza-
tion.
Proposed Statute, supra note ?, § 1118(e)(2).
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serving such organizations are often the targets of politically motivated assassi-
nation attempts. 24 The item also encompasses representatives of international
organizations and states not recognized by the United States. By casting its net
so widely, the Committee intended to close any loopholes that might permit
politics to drive an assassination operation. For the Committee, political
motivation was the key to defining assassination.
This conclusion gains further support from the fact that the statute does not
cover circumstances where the United States is engaged in hostilities with any
of the aforementioned states or organizations. It specifically denies protection
to the enumerated officials when the United States is involved in combat
against the entity they represent pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.'
In the mid-1970s, Congress was engaged in a post-Vietnam effort to
recapture war-making authority from the Executive Branch; hence, the pro-
posed statute emphasized the declaration of war or a War Powers Resolution.
Given the overall purpose of the statute, however, the hostilities exclusion
cannot be viewed as an attempt by Congress to protect the right to commit
United States troops to combat. Instead, since the issue was assassination, this
exclusion must be viewed both as an acknowledgment that the targeting of
certain officials would not constitute assassination under the law of armed
conflict, and as a desire to avoid unreasonably limiting valid military opera-
tions. 6 From the Committee's perspective, therefore, a domestic ban on
assassination should be strictly limited to peacetime situations.
In summary, analysis of the Church Committee's views on assassination
yields the following conclusions:
1) Assassination is politically motivated.
2) Clandestine or covert operations are more likely than overt actions to
constitute assassination.
3) A ban on assassination does not preclude support for coups in which an
official may possibly be killed or assassinated. Instead, each operation must
be evaluated contextually to determine the likelihood of assassination.
224. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 238.
225. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
226. The Church Committee acknowledged that the President had the authority to act on his own in
certain circumstances, apparently without a declaration of war or an invocation of the War Powers
Resolution. It noted that "[in a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to act, not in violation
of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities under the Constitution to defend the Nation .... "
CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 284. This comment came in response to some witnesses who, citing
Hitler as an example, asked whether assassination should be ruled out even in extraordinary circumstances.
However, though recognizing that situations might require the President to act outside the confines of the
proposed statute, the Committee provided the following caveat: "any action taken by a president pursuant
to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law must be disclosed to Congress. Only
then can Congress judge whether the action truly represented ... an 'indispensable necessity' to the life
of the Nation." Id
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4) A killing justified by imminent physical danger to the United States
would be unlikely to amount to assassination.
5) Assassination prohibitions are not limited to heads of state, but cover
a range of officials representing states and non-governmental organizations.
6) The term assassination is not meant to cover operations occurring during
periods of armed conflict.
B. Executive and Congressional Initiatives in the Aftermath of the Church
Report
Interestingly, even before the Church Committee began to inquire actively
into government involvement in assassination, there was a clear policy trend
toward convergence with the Committee's recommendations. Most notably,
in 1972 Director Helms responded to press allegations of CIA involvement by
circulating a memo instructing agency personnel not to undertake or support
such operations. 7 His successor, William Colby, did precisely the same
thing the following year."
Once the investigations began, the Executive Branch publicly condemned
assassination. In June 1975, President Ford announced his opposition to
political assassination and banned its use during his administration.' The
next year, he issued Executive Order 11,905, the first of three presidential
orders addressing assassination. It provided that "[n]o employee of the United
States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in political assassina-
tion." 0 By the time the Church Report was published, the Executive Branch
was unanimous in its condemnation of assassination.
Subsequent administrations continued to ban assassination. In 1978, Presi-
dent Carter issued Executive Order 12,306, a slightly modified version of
Ford's original order. In addition to extending its scope to those "acting on
behalf of the United States," Carter's order deleted the word "political" as a
modifier of assassination. 1 Then, upon gaining power President Reagan
issued Executive Order 12,333. It maintained Carter's text intact, while adding
227. The memo stated:
It has recently been alleged in the press that CIA engages in assassination. As you are well
aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline
it, however, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by
any of our personnel ....
Memorandum from CIA Director Helms to Deputy Directors (Mar. 6, 1972) (on file with author).
228. See Memorandum from CIA Director Colby to Deputy Directors (Aug. 29, 1973) ("The CIA
will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest to others that assassination be employed.")
(on file with author).
229. 11 WKLY. COM. PRES. Doc. 611 (June 9, 1975).
230. Exec. Order No. 11,905, § 5(g), 3 C.F.R. 90, 101 (1976), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 at
1848, 1853 (West 1976).
231. Exec. Order No. 12,036, § 2-305, 3 C.F.R. 112, 129 (1978), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401
at 1576, 1583 (West Supp. 1111979).
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a new section that read: "Indirect Participation: No agency of the Intelligence
Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities
forbidden by this Order."3 2 Reagan's Executive Order remains in effect for
the Bush Administration.
Throughout this period Congress made several unsuccessful attempts to
legislate a ban. In 1976, a House bill provided that "whoever, except in time
of war, while engaged in the duties of an intelligence operation of the Govern-
ment of the United States, willfully kills any person shall be imprisoned for
not less than one year."" Two years later, the Senate attempted to outlaw
the killing of a foreign official "because of such official's office or position,
or because of such official's political views, actions, or statements."I 4 A
1980 effort in both chambers to implement President Carter's executive order
was equally unsuccessful. 235
Perhaps the most noteworthy attempt came in the aftermath of the 1986
raid on Libya. Both the House and Senate introduced bills that would have
authorized the President "to undertake actions to protect United States citizens
against terrorists and terrorist activity through the use of such anti-terrorism
and counter-terrorism measures as he deems necessary." 6 A number of
Congressmen, including two powerful sponsors, Jeremiah Denton and Robert
Dole, reportedly interpreted the legislation to authorize assassination as a
legitimate counter-terrorist operation. 7 One sponsor claimed Qadhafi's death
in the raid would have been acceptable under the terms of the bill. 8 Neither
the House nor Senate version made it out of committee.
C. The Ban on Assassination Interpreted in Light of U.S. Practice
1. Legislation Affecting Assassination
Though no legislation prohibiting assassination has successfully passed into
law, a number of current statutes affect assassination operations. Several make
killing, attempts to kill, or conspiracies to kill certain U.S. officials illegal. 9
232. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1981).
233. H.R. 15,542, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(1) (1976).
234. S. 2525, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 134(5) (1978).
235. S. 2284, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 131 (1980); H.R. 6588, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 131 (1980).
236. S. Res. 2335, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1986); H.R. 4611, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(b) (1986).
237. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Tension Over Libya, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 18, 1986, at A9; Helen
Dewar, GOP Lawmakers Propose Strengthening Reagan Antiterror Hand, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1986,
at A24.
238. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 277 app. 7 (1986).
239. 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1988) (kill, attempt to kill, or conspire to kill member of Congress, member
of Congress elect, department head or nominee, second ranking individual in department, Director of
Central Intelligence or Deputy Director, major presidential candidate, or Supreme Court Justice or
nominee); 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1988) (threatening to kill or kidnap President, Vice President, President Elect
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Although such acts would be illegal anyway, these laws classify the offense
as a federal crime, emphasizing the special protection designated for govern-
ment officials. Another law authorizes the President to furnish assistance to
foreign countries to help combat terrorism. That law specifically cites assassi-
nation as a terrorist act.2' Finally, a specific statute implementing the New
York Convention prohibits the killing of an internationally protected person.
That statute, however, covers killings only occurring within the United
States. 241
What is the meaning to be attributed to the instruments cited above, and
do they contribute to an understanding of the current ban? First, it is reason-
able to conclude that the CIA Directives and the Ford executive order are no
more restrictive than the recommendations of the Church Committee. A
Congressional committee reviewing possible executive misconduct in the
aftermath of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, and cognizant of the presi-
dential pronouncements on assassination, would be highly unlikely to conclude
that the executive limitations were too restrictive. This contention finds support
in comments in the Church Report that approved of the pronouncements and
of Ford's executive order. 242
In light of the modifications it made to its predecessor, President Carter's
order arguably could be read as expanding the Committee's proposed prohibi-
tions. In particular, the "acting on behalf" language invites the conclusion that
involvement in coup attempts was to be strictly limited. Similarly, the deletion
of the term "political" could be seen as enlarging the scope of the previous
ban. In fact, broadly prohibitive interpretations of the Carter Executive Order
were advanced, particularly within Congress.243
However, President Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brze-
zinski, later indicated that he believed the order was interpreted as more
restrictive than the President had intended. In his opinion, President Carter
never meant the order to foreclose support for a coup if the possibility that the
target would be killed could not be ruled out. The order simply did not require
planners to decide in advance the consequences of the coup.2' This view
comports with the Committee's understanding. Thus, Carter's revisions are
best characterized as merely closing potential textual loopholes in the previous
order.
or other officer next in line of succession); 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988) (killing federal law enforcement
official or member of federal judiciary); 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988) (Idlling individuals mentioned in section
871 or member of presidential staff).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 2349aa (1990).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1988).
242. However, these comments also recommended legislation to ensure that the Executive Branch
would not resort to assassination in the future. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 281-82.
243. One on One (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1989) (John McLaughlin interviewing Zbigniew
Brzezinsid).
244. Id.
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2. The CIA Psychological Operations Manual in Nicaragua
The subject of assassination became imbued with controversy during the
Reagan administration. In 1984, public revelations that the CIA had provided
Contra forces in Nicaragua with a manual encouraging assassination of various
government officials sparked the debate. The publication, Psychological
Operations in Guerilla Warfare, described itself as "a manual for the training
of guerrillas in psychological operations, and its application to the concrete
case of the Christian and democratic crusade being waged in Nicaragua by the
Freedom Commandos." '24 In a section labeled "Selective Use of Violence
for Propagandistic Effects," the manual advised:
It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such as court
judges, mesta judges, police and State Security officials, CDS chiefs, etc. For
psychological purposes it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is abso-
lutely necessary to gather together the population affected, so that they will be
present, take part in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor.m
It later noted that "[i]f possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry
out specific selective 'jobs'. "247
A firestorm of controversy erupted over the manual. The Nicaraguans
brought the matter to the International Court of Justice, which held that "by
producing . . . and disseminating [the manual] to contra forces, [the United
States] has encouraged commission by them of acts contrary to general princi-
ples of humanitarian law.""248 Since the Court also held that United States
activity in support of the Contras was not self-defense,249 the finding is con-
sistent with international law regarding assassination outside the law of armed
conflict. Specific individuals were targeted and, if the United States was not
validly engaged in self-defense, the encouragement of killings clearly would
be politically motivated. Indeed, political figures were among the primary
targets. However, the Court also held that the production of the manual was,
in a sense, a renegade operation. As a result, there was "no basis for conclud-
ing that any such acts which may have been committed are imputable to the
United States of America as acts of the United States of America. ,,2S
Domestically, the operation would appear to have violated the second tier
of the Reagan assassination ban, i.e., forbidding encouragement of assassina-
tion. Not surprisingly, the Administration quickly distanced itself from the
245. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 65 (June 27) (quoting
manual's preface). According to evidence brought before the Court, about two thousand copies of the
manual were sent to the Contras. Another three thousand were reportedly printed, but only one hundred
are believed to have reached Nicaragua. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 66.
248. Id. at 148. The Court ruled 14-1 on this matter, with Judge Oda dissenting.
249. See, e.g., id. at 104.
250. Id. at 148.
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operation. President Reagan directed both the CIA and the Intelligence Over-
sight Board to investigate the matter."5' Further, during a televised election
debate with Walter Mondale, the President stated that preparation and dissemi-
nation of the manual was "in direct contravention of my own executive order
of 1981 that we would have nothing to do with regard to political assassina-
tion."252
The House Committee on Intelligence also took up the matter. Noting the
great embarrassment the manual had caused to the United States, the Commit-
tee found that it should not have been released and that the "specific actions
it describes are repugnant to American values."253 Consistent with both the
International Court and the Administration's characterization of the affair,
however, the Committee concluded that the plan was concocted by only a few
CIA officers acting without authority or sufficient supervision. Thus, the
government had committed no intentional violation of Executive Order
12,333. 4
Ultimately, three of the six CIA officials involved were reprimanded, and
two were suspended without pay. The sixth, a contract employee who actually
prepared the manual, had his contract terminated. Among those reportedly
punished was the CIA station chief in the Honduras. 5
The incident reveals the operational code governing the domestic ban on
assassination. Although the ban was not intentionally violated, virtually all the
elite considered the acts impermissible under Executive Order 12,333. Appar-
ently, the criteria emerging from the Church investigation remained relatively
intact under the Reagan order. Given the targets (judges, political figures,
etc.), the proposed killings were clearly political. At the same time, as a covert
operation the affair was subject to greater scrutiny. With regard to coup
involvement, the operation was not designed to support activity that might
result in the killing of an official; it was direct encouragement of such acts.
The affair also demonstrates that the ban encompassed more than high-ranking
officials. The issue is more complex in determining the status of armed
conflict. Although the United States argued that its actions in Nicaragua were
motivated by self-defense, an assertion the Court rejected, it did not extend
this claim to cover distribution of the manual. Thus, even from the U.S.
251. Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, United States Policy
Concerning Political Assassination, 20 WKLY. COMPI. PRES. Doc. 1568 (Oct. 18, 1984).
252. Debate Transcript, Reagan-Mondale, Kansas City, UPI, Oct. 21, 1984, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
253. PERMANENT HOUSE COMM. ON INTELUGENCE, REPORT ON AcTIVITIES, H.R. REP. No. 1196,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1985).
254. Id.
255. CIA Mid-Level Personnel Punished on TerrorManual, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Nov.
16, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, U.S. Aftirs File.
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perspective, the Nicaraguan situation did not cross threshold of armed conflict.
In 1984, therefore, it appears that the ban as originally envisaged was in place.
3. The 1986 Raid on Libya
The next debate on assassination came after the 1986 air attack on Libya.
At 2 A.M. on April 15, 1986, U.S. F-1 ls based in England began bombing
three targets in the vicinity of Tripoli: El Azziziya Barracks, the home and
headquarters of Muammar Qadaffi; Sida Bilal port, a training site for terror-
ists; and the military sections of Tripoli International Airport. Simultaneously,
carrier-based A-6s hit two targets in Benghazi: Benina Airfield and Jamahir-
iyah Barracks, an alternate command post facility. 6 During the raid on El
Azziziya Barracks, Qadhafi's wife and two sons were injured, and an adopted
daughter was killed. Qadhafi himself escaped unharmed.
The international response to the attack was mixed but generally negative.
The United Kingdom, Israel and South Africa alone formally supported the
strike, 7 while France and West Germany were guardedly critical. 8 Mid-
dle-Eastern states decried the use of force against an Arab nation,2 9 and the
U.N. General Assembly denounced the attack. A Security Council Resolution
condemning both Libyan terrorism and the U.S. raid was vetoed by the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France.2
60
The international reaction did not send a clear message about assassination
specifically. Those states that condemned the raid generally did so based on
a rationale of wrongful resort to force. That the reactions ostensibly were
mixed, however, dilutes any prescriptive effect. It appears that the overt nature
of the attack resulted in much of the public outrage in Arab states.26' Reac-
tion in the United States, on the other hand, was favorable, with bipartisan
Congressional support and a seventy-seven percent public approval rating.
262
One might conclude from this that the American people favor operations to
256. U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Apr. 18, 1986, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, U.S. Affairs File. On the raid generally, see BRIAN L. DAVIS, QADHARI,
TERRORISM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE U.S. ATTACK ON LIBYA (1990).
257. U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets, supra note 256.
258. Although France condemned the raid as a reprisal, French officials later acknowledged that they
actually favored stronger military action. France was also apparently irritated at not being notified earlier
of the planned operation. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 77, at 109. Germany, while indicating its
preference for political solutions, seemed to acceptthe U.S. self-defense argument. According to Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, "whoever continually preaches and practices violence, as [Qadhafil does, must count on the
victims' defending themselves." Norman Kempster, Reagan Calls Raid a Victory, Expects Struggle to
Continue, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, at 1.
259. U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets, supra note 256.
260. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 77, at 110 (citing G.A. Res. 41138, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 34, U.N. Doe. A/41151 (1986)).
261. See, e.g., REISMAN & BAmE, supra note 77, at 109-11.
262. U.S. Jets Bomb Libyan Targets, supra note 256.
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kill individuals like Qadhafi, regardless of potential violations of the assassina-
tion ban. Indeed, in a public opinion poll conducted just prior to the attack,
sixty-one percent of respondents agreed the United States should "covertly
assassinate terrorist leaders. "I Aware of the public opinion, some Senators
proposed liberalizing Executive Order 12,333,21 while others sponsored
legislation to expand Presidential discretion in dealing with terrorism.'s
Yet the Reagan Administration did not view the order as limiting its options
for dealing with terrorists, and it proposed no change to Executive Order
12,333. In fact, it argued that the raid did not violate the ban. First, the
Administration repeatedly denied that Qadhafi was a target. President Reagan
publicly stated that "we weren't out to kill anybody," ' a message echoed
by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of State Schultz, and others
in the Administration. 7 The Reagan Administration characterized the attack
as a legitimate self-defense operation under Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter.s The April 1986 bombing of La Belle Disco in West Berlin prompted
the response by the United States. Intelligence information indicated that Libya
263. Brian Jenkins, Assassination: Should We Stay the Good Guys?, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1986,
§ 5, at 2.
264. Senator Pressler questioned the wisdom of engaging in bombing when other methods less deadly
to innocents might achieve the intended results:
I do not propose that we revert to the age of Machiavelli, when assassination was a common
instrument of state policy. But I do believe we should broaden the President's options for coping
with terrorism. The military option, as demonstrated in the Libyan case last week, is a massive
tool with which to pursue terrorists. I do not question the propriety of utilizing that option in this
case, and I do support the President's action. But we should be considering whether there are
other ways to combat terrorists than by aerial or missile bombardment of cities.
I know that it is repugnant to our thinking and repugnant in a democracy to even talk of such
things, but we may be living in an era in which, to protect the lives of American citizens, we
might need to consider changing that Executive Order.
132 CoNG. REc. S4574 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
265. See supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
266. Michael R. Gordon, Reagan Denies Libya Raid Was Meant to Kill Qadhafi, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
19, 1986, at A5.
267. Matthew C. Quinn, Reagan Says U.S. Didn't Try to Kill Khadfy UPI, Apr. 18,1986, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
268. Actually, the Administration's statements seemed to include justifications based on both
anticipatory self-defense and reprisal. For example, in the President's national address, he initially seemed
to indicate the action was a reprisal for Libyan terrorism: "Several weeks ago in New Orleans, I warned
Colonel Qadhafi we would hold his regime accountable for any new terrorist attacks launched against
American citizens. More recently, I made it clear we would respond as soon as we determined conclusively
who was responsible..." Reagan then provided a classic self-defense justification: "Self-defense is not
only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight-a mission fully
consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter." President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation (Apr. 14,
1986), in DEP'T ST. BuLL., June 1986, at 1-2; see also White House Statement, DEP'T ST. BULL., June
1986, at 1.
The best approach, given the number of Libyan-sponsored terrorist operations against American
interests, is to view the situation as one of continuing attack, justifying standard self-defense. This avoids
any controversy over the unsettled doctrines of reprisal and anticipatory self-defense.
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was directly involved in the bombing, and that Libya was planning future
attacks on up to thirty United States diplomatic facilities worldwide.269
Despite administration denials that Qadhafi was a target, speculation to the
contrary circulated.27 Perhaps in response to such allegations, senior offi-
cials later offered a second explanation. Most noteworthy was that put forth
in 1989 by Judge Sofaer, formerly the State Department Legal Advisor.
Maintaining that the raid was valid and legal, he added:
Nor was Colonel Qadhafi personally immune from the risks of exposure to a
legitimate attack. He was and is personally responsible for Libya's policy of
training, assisting, and utilizing terrorists in attacks on United States citizens,
diplomats, troops, and facilities. His position as head of state provided him no legal
immunity from being attacked when present at a proper military target. 27'
Judge Sofaer did not say that Qadhafiper se was a valid target, but rather that
he would be when present at a proper military target. That an individual's
position does not immunize him from being a collateral victim of a lawful
attack seems reasonable. Sofaer, however, seemed to be saying more. In the
last sentence of the cited passage he used the term "being attacked." Since
civilian targets cannot lawfully be the object of attack, then, unless Judge
Sofaer misspoke, he must have considered Qadhafi a legitimate target. As a
whole, the passage suggests that if an individual, official or not, is engaged
in an activity meriting a self-defensive response, he himself may become a
lawful target. In essence, Judge Sofaer was applying the law of armed conflict.
What can the Libya raid tell us about Executive Order 12,333 in relation
to the operational code? First, a narrow reading of the order seems to find
widespread support among the general public and certain political elites.
Although Qadhafi sometimes lived at El Azziziya Barracks and surely might
have been killed in the attack, the Administration maintained that the ban
would apply only to more specific targeting.
Judge Sofaer took an even narrower approach. In applying the law of
armed conflict, he implicitly suggested that the ban survives only to the degree
prescribed under the law of war. One might question whether an operation
meets the criteria of armed conflict; but this question is separate from the issue
of the ban's limits after hostilities commence. This interpretation is consistent
269. JointNews Conference by George Schultz, Secretary of State, and Casper Weinberger, Secretary
of Defense (Apr. 14, 1986), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 3.
270. Seymour Hersh, writing in the New York 7imes, asserted that the primary goal of the raid was
to kill Qadhafi. He based his conclusion on over 70 interviews with current and former officials in the
White House, the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of Defense. According to Hersh, the
operation was planned in the National Security Council by a small group of officials including Oliver North
and John Poindexter. Furthermore, the idea of killing Qadhafi's family apparently was the brainchild of
several senior CIA officers who believed that in a "Bedouin culture Qadhafi would be diminished as a
leader if he could not protect his home." Seymour M. Hersh, Target Qadhafi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 17. On the strategy against Libya generally, see Bob Woodward, State Department Plan
Urged Libya Coup, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 1, 1986, at Al.
271. Sofaer, supra note 6, at 120.
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with the Church Report, the proposed legislation, and analysis under interna-
tional law.
The Reagan Administration essentially interpreted the domestic ban along
the lines of its predecessors. It continued to restrict the use of political assassi-
nation as a direct instrument of foreign policy except in situations of armed
conflict. When such conflict arose, either the ban gave way to the law of
armed conflict, or it remained operative but only in accordance with that law.
Although lacking practical differentiation, the latter view is more politically
appealing.2'
4. The Failed Giroldi Coup in Panama
Executive Order 12,333 continues to apply under the Bush Administra-
tion.273 While events again have forced reconsideration of the order's proper
interpretation, the operational code governing its application remains intact.
In 1989, the issue of assassination recaptured attention following the attempted
coup in Panama by Major Moises Giroldi Vega against the government of
Manuel Noriega. The Administration clearly wanted Noriega toppled. Yet
when the coup that was encouraged by the United States began to falter,
United States forces did not intervene to salvage the venture. The Bush Admin-
istration drew sharp criticism for cutting the plotters adrift at the crucial
moment.
Administration officials reacted to criticism by accusing Congress of
interpreting the assassination ban too broadly, thereby imposing excessive
limitations on U.S. support of coups. The interpretation stems from a Senate
Intelligence Committee (Intelligence Committee) letter issued in 1988 when
the Administration presented the Intelligence Committee with a plan for a
Panamanian coup. An accompanying CIA assessment reportedly indicated that
Noriega might be killed and that the Administration did not directly control
the coup plotters. The Intelligence Committee forwarded a letter to President
Reagan formally disapproving the plan. The letter apparently also suggested
that the CIA had an obligation to prevent assassination if a foreigner recruited
by the United States intended to engage in such activities. This comment was
272. Reports did emerge in 1988, based in part on Bob Woodward's Veil: The Secret Wars ofthe CIA,
that in 1984 and 1985 President Reagan signed intelligence authorizations suggesting that actions taken
during a covert anti-terrorist operation would be deemed lawful if officially approved and undertaken in
good faith. These authorizations were described as "licenses to kill" by the media. The Reagan Administra-
tion denied the existence of such documents. See, e.g., Lee May, Reagan Denies He Gave CIA a 'License
to Kill, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1988, at 7; Stephen Engelberg, U.S. Order on Anti-Terror Strikes Is
Disclosed, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1988, at A13; Bob Woodward & Walter Pincus, CIA Reportedly Got
License to Kill" Terrorists, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1988, at 1.
273. Parks, supra note 4, at 4.
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interpreted by some as requiring the United States to provide advance notice
to targeted individuals if it learned of an assassination plot.274
The failed coup attempt highlighted the matter. Defense Secretary Cheney
testified before the Intelligence Committee that the guidelines had inhibited the
administration from establishing communication with the coup plotters.275
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft also criticized the restrictions,
attacking the Intelligence Committee for "micromanagement of the executive
branch going clear back to the executive order prohibiting assassinations,
which was forced by Congress."276
Indeed the Intelligence Committee has no power to interpret the executive
order in a binding manner. Its role is to review intelligence operations, not to
forbid or approve them. Nevertheless, the importance of maintaining public
support and international credibility in foreign affairs effectively lend the
Intelligence Committee de facto supervisory power. Not surprisingly, the
Intelligence Committee denied allegations that it had broadened the restrictions.
Senator Cohen, while defending the decision not to move against Noriega,
indicated that "[t]here is merit for the President and Congress to explore how
we might clarify existing legal ambiguities that unwittingly may have reduced
our intelligence officers to passive listening posts." 2' Senator Boren was
more to the point, arguing that the executive order should not be subject to
"extreme interpretations."278 In particular, he maintained that United States
274. Stephen Engelberg, White House, Noriega and Battle in Congress, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1989,
at A10. During a meeting with a group of senators, President Bush cited the notification "requirement"
as an example of congressional limitations in covert actions like the Giroldi coup.
275. Ruth Marcus & Ann Devroy, Bush Faults Rules Governing Covert Action Against Norlega,
WAsH. PosT, Oct. 23, 1989, at Al. According to the article, however, two senior CIA officials told the
Washington Post after Cheney's comments that the congressional restrictions did not limit CIA activities
in the Giroldi coup. Id. On the other hand, Director Webster told the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence after the coup attempt that certain United States agents in Panama were uncertain whether they
would have been disciplined for violating the executive order in assisting Giroldi's forces. Andrew Blake,
Fx-CIA Aide Appears to Seek Latitude on Foreign Operations, BOSTON GLoBE, Apr. 5, 1990, at 84.
276. David Wise, No License to Kill, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 1989, at 1, reprinted in 136 CONG. REC.
S183 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1990).
277. William Cohen, Not Worth American Killing, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 17, 1989, at A27, reprinted
in 135 CONG. REc. S13,827 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1989). Senator Cohen argued against dispensing with the
ban despite difficulties in application:
For example, what if the target of an attack is a group rather than an individual? Or the attack
itself involves not a rifle's silver bulletbut a bomb dropped from an FB-111? After all, Executive
Order 12,333 would appear to ban placing a poison pen in one of Col. Moammar Gadhafi's jump
suits, but permit the release of a gravity bomb from several thousand feet onto his desert
compound. How is one then to presume? Does the law turn upon whether a bullet or bomb
carries a victim's name?
These are not questions reserved for theologians, but practical difficulties confronting those
who serve on the front lines of danger. In the killing zone there are many cruel anomalies.
Morality there may be measured in meters.... The fact that it is difficult to determine the nature
of an individual's intent, however, does not mean we should abandon any effort to make that
determination.
Id.
278. Thomas Powers, The Perils of Covert Policy, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1989, at MI.
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support should not be prohibited if assassination per se was not an explicit
goal; he further stated that the Intelligence Committee never intended to
require warnings to foreign leaders of imminent coups that could potentially
result in their death.2' In light of these statements, it is not surprising that
President Bush and the Intelligence Committee agreed that the ban would not
prohibit U.S. involvement in certain coup attempts and would not require
supplying advance notice to potential assassination targets.2 °
Despite the Intelligence Committee's initial desire to read Executive Order
12,333 broadly, all sides appear to have agreed after the Giroldi affair that the
domestic ban on assassination should be interpreted as it had since inception.
Nevertheless, the debate proved that the ban was fraught with ambiguity.
Effective supervision of future U.S. operations would require clearer guide-
lines.
5. Executive Memoranda and Opinions
The Army made the first attempt to provide such guidance. Even before
the Giroldi coup attempt, senior Army experts in international law had pre-
pared a memorandum seeking to define the content of Executive Order 12,333
and international prohibitions on assassination. In December 1989, the memo-
randum was published in Army Lawyer. Before publication, the press learned
of the memo and characterized it as an attempt to narrow Executive Order
12,333 to the point of rendering it meaningless. Some members of the press
even claimed that the memo permitted assassination.28'
The confusion was ill-founded. The memorandum was designed to stimulate
discussion for implementing the assassination ban in a 1991 version of the
Army Manual. It was not intended to prescribe policy.2 2 Moreover, a careful
reading reveals that the document is relatively non-controversial. The contro-
versy apparently was sparked by the article's discussion of the combatant/non-
combatant distinction in the context of various levels of conflict. An analysis
of this distinction, however, is not essential in determining whether a particular
279. Ild.
280. Id
281. DepanmentofDefensePressBriefing, FED. NEws SERVICE, Apr. 11, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, U.S. Affairs File (briefing by Dan Howard) [hereinafter Howard Briefing].
282. Department of Defense Regular Press Briefing, FED. NEws SERVICE, Oct. 17, 1989, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, U.S. Affairs File (briefing by Pete Williams). Referring to the memo, Defense
Department spokesman Howard observed:
It was drafted by a bunch of lawyers for a bunch of lawyers. And they're going to nitpick over
it and decide what goes as a footnote in this manual here. This is not a-this sort of instruction
and internal debate is not required for the national command authority, the President, to decide
what needs to be done in dealing with a terrorist situation. We're not trying to close the barn
door after the horse ran away.
Howard Briefing, supra note 281.
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killing amounts to assassination. Specifically targeting a civilian during armed
conflict is illegal, but in the absence of treachery, it is not assassination.
Instead, it is a violation of the more basic ban on targeting civilians. Neverthe-
less, the combatant/noncombatant distinction may be relevant in determining
whether a killing was politically motivated, and thus violated the ban.
Correct or not, the conclusions drawn in the memorandum are more
permissive than those found in Protocol I. The conclusions as to what is or is
not assassination, however, vary little, if at all, from the operational code in
place since the Church Committee investigations. The memorandum essentially
sets forth two premises. First, Executive Order 12,333 was intended to "pre-
clude unilateral actions by individual agents or agencies against selected foreign
public officials and to establish beyond any doubt that the United States does
not condone assassination as an instrument of national policy."28 3 Second,
it was not intended to prevent the United States from acting in self-defense
against "legitimate threats to national security." '' Although the terms "self-
defense" and "national security" are subject to abuse, assuming appropriate
application, the conclusions accurately state the law.
Additional sources in the Administration have attempted to clarify matters.
CIA Director William Webster called on Congress and the President in Octo-
ber 1989 to give the Agency greater latitude in dealing with coups. Specifical-
ly, he argued that the Agency should be allowed to deal with coup plotters
even in cases where individuals may be fatally at risk. Webster stated that this
would not violate the U.S. policy against "selective, individual assassina-
tion. "' The White House endorsed this view.286
Finally, the Department of Justice issued a legal opinion in late 1989
designed to clarify Executive Order 12,333. Although the opinion remains
classified, other sources suggest that it confirms existing policy and does not
propose new interpretations. The premise of the opinion, as noted by Webster,
is that "you cannot equate violence with assassination,"' 87 a creeping tenden-
cy existing prior to the U.S. failure to act in the Giroldi coup attempt.
Presumably with the Giroldi affair in mind, the opinion focused on assis-
tance to coup plotters. The United States would not directly participate in an
operation to kill a foreign leader. Nevertheless, the prohibition against support-
ing coup plotters applied only where assassination was the goal. Asked whether
283. Parks, supra note 4, at 8.
284. Id.
285. Wise, supra note 276. Another view was that the order's ambiguity helped foster caution in covert
operations. As Representative Beilenson, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee argued, "[t]he
fact that there's a little bit of uncertainty about the Executive Order serves a useful purpose. We should
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286. Powers, supra note 278, at 1.
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this meant that an "accidental killing" of a political figure would not violate
the ban, Director Webster replied: "That's the legal guidance."28 Additional-
ly, the opinion made clear that Executive Order 12,333 imposed no require-
ment to notify possible targets of coup plots.289
Once again, the efforts to clarify the domestic ban on assassination did not
change the standards of permissibility.' On the contrary, they track the
legal criteria implicit in the Church Report. Possible confusion arises at the
periphery of issues relating to self-defense and the specific goals of the coup
plotters. In legal terms, the substantive rule is well established. Problems arise
primarily in establishing the evidence necessary to meet the threshold for
proving a violation.
6. The Gulf War
Comments on military operations during the Persian Gulf conflict, howev-
er, provide fresh confirmation that confusion persists. Most noteworthy was
Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan's comment that Saddam Hussein
might be a target of coalition air strikes. General Dugan was dismissed for his
remarks. 291 Although the press characterized Dugan's comment as advocating
assassination, Saddam's status as a combatant suggests that he was a lawful
target.
Yet the issue was really about policy, not law.* As General Schwartzkopf
observed, the United States does not "have a policy of trying to kill any
particular individual."292 In light of the delicate character of the Gulf coali-
tion, not seeking to kill Saddam directly probably was good policy; avoiding
public admissions of this objective certainly was good policy.
Confusion was not limited to the press. For example, Representative
McEwen introduced a resolution in the House to suspend the application of
Executive Order 12,333 to Iraq until Hussein complied with all the U.N.
resolutions relating to the Kuwait invasion. 93 He argued that the order "pre-
vent[ed] us from targeting the sources of attack upon the American forces,"
and that "[iln this trying time, those military planners, those Secretaries of
Defense, those Commanders-in-Chief, that pilot who is flying into Baghdad,
should not have to be faced with the possibility of having violated an executive
288. Id.
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order.""' The proposal was unnecessary, however, since Executive Order
12,333 would not have prevented the killing of Saddam Hussein in the absence
of treachery, assuming that the order even applies during war.
The widespread confusion relating to the issue of assassination was aptly
illustrated during a Nightline television episode on the possibility of targeting
Saddam Hussein. Responding to a question by Ted Koppel, Judge Sofaer
correctly stated the law on the subject:
Q: Strictly speaking, is targeting Saddam Hussein illegal under U.S. law?
A: Well, there's an executive order that prohibits assassination, and I understand
assassination to mean an illegal killing, such as murder. Any killing in the middle
of a war of a military figure would not be illegal.
Q: But if you know he's in a certain villa and you send in fighter-bombers to hit
that villa with a fairly safe confidence that you're going to be killing him, is that
legal or illegal?
A: Well, putting aside the propriety of such a thing, or political wisdom of it, I
would think it was clearly legal.'
Professor Abraham Chayes of Harvard Law School, who served as Legal
Advisor to the State Department during the Kennedy Administration, had a
different interpretation:
Q: Legal or illegal?
A: As I said, first, there is an executive order prohibiting assassination by any
employee or anyone else acting on behalf of the United States. In addition, we are
party to a treaty for the prevention of crimes against protected persons, and the first
in the list of protected persons is a head of state, and the treaty prohibits murder
or other attacks on heads of state. And it's-
Q: Even in the case of war?
A: -well, I think you raised the point yourself in your questioning of Judge Sofaer.
If Saddam was out leading his troops and he got killed in the midst of an engage-
ment, well, that's one thing. But if he is deliberately and selectively targeted, I think
that's another, and if we're going to start building a "new order" under the rule of
law, I think we ought to start applying it to ourselves .2
These comments simply misstate the law. First, the treaty that Professor
Chayes mentioned, the New York Convention, neither criminalizes any acts
nor applies to heads of state targeted within their own country. Instead, it
requires signatories to implement domestic legislation outlawing the killing of
selected officials who are abroad. Second, lawful targeting in wartime has
never required that the individual actually be engaged in combat. Rather, it
depends on combatant status. The general directing operations miles from
battle is as valid a target as the commander leading his troops into combat. The
same applies to Saddam Hussein. Once he became a combatant, the law of war
clearly permitted targeting him.
294. 137 CONG. REc. H536, H-537 (1991).





7. Principles for Evaluating Individual Targeting
That such an eminent legal scholar as Professor Chayes so misunderstands
the law on assassination is strong evidence that the issue requires much
clarification. The following analysis provides a general guideline for applying
the current U.S. operational code.
First, if there is a state of armed conflict, the ban on assassination is
governed by the law of armed conflict, and the focus is on the issue of treach-
ery. Since the law of armed conflict generally only regulates the conduct of
hostilities (jus in bello) and not the taking of arms itself (!us ad bellum), the
validity of the initial resort to force does not affect the analysis. However,
when it is unclear whether armed conflict exists under international law, the
validity of using force per se will increase the likelihood that the killing will
not be deemed unlawful under the political motivation criterion, even if it is
later determined that no state of armed conflict existed.
Second, in the absence of armed conflict, if the operation does not target
a specific individual for who he is or what he does, the killing is not assassina-
tion, though it may violate other domestic or international laws.
Third, a killing must be politically motivated to constitute assassination
during peacetime. Although determining intent is a difficult task, as a general
rule, the more highly placed the target, the more likely it is that the killing is
political. Acts of self-defense that comport with the principles of necessity and
proportionality under international law trigger the rules applying to armed
conflict. Under these rules, political motivation becomes irrelevant.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Practical Constraints
Operations involving specific targeting merit careful consideration of the
norms governing assassination; indeed, even operations with honorable or
beneficial purposes must be rejected if they violate the assassination prohibi-
tions. However, relations between states involve more than issues of law.
Every international act, particularly those involving force, must be further
evaluated from a cost-benefit perspective. Both the interests of the state
contemplating action and the world community must be taken into consider-
ation. The following factors, although not an exhaustive list, are relevant to
the policymaker's consideration of targeting operations. They are offered
primarily to encourage further reflection.
1) Even if a specific targeting cannot be characterized as assassination, it
is not automatically legal. In the absence of armed conflict, a host of doctrines
prohibit resort to violence as a means for resolving international disputes. In
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particular, international law creates a rebuttable presumption, deriving in great
part from Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, against using force for other than
defensive purposes. This presumption does not prohibit all other uses of force
are prohibited. Those who resort to force, however, will bear the burden of
proof. Additionally, since assassination is a specific element of the firmly
entrenched general restriction on the use of force, the burden in the case of
individual targeting will be especially high.
Once a state of armed conflict arises, the subjective nature of the evaluation
diminishes, and many acts that would otherwise be illegal become acceptable.
Nonetheless, numerous restrictions would prohibit a non-treacherous killing.
Most importantly, noncombatants cannot be the object of attack, and a careful
analysis of the target's status under the law of armed conflict is therefore
essential. Similarly, the law restricts the means of causing death, as, for
example, in the case with poison. Regardless of treachery, a killing using
outlawed weapons will be illegal. Finally, every operation must be tested
against the overarching principles of necessity and proportionality, for even
non-treacherous killings of combatants using acceptable methods may be
deemed impermissible.
2) Targetiig specific individuals may unintentionally strengthen enemy
morale and resolve. The more visible and popular the target, the more likely
this result will be. Cultural factors will affect the degree to which this phenom-
enon occurs. In the Middle East, for example, the concept of martyrdom
makes individual targeting particularly risky.
3) Targeting specific individuals might lead to retaliation, especially since
some potential targets may have terrorist links. Policymakers must carefully
weigh the possibility that their own leaders and citizens may become targets
as a result of operations.
4) Individual targeting always runs the risk of leading to escalation. Target-
ing, correctly or not, is perceived as a qualitative increase in the level of
violence. Therefore, the state against which the tactic is aimed may respond
by escalating the means of warfare. Escalation is especially likely when that
state cannot similarly target its opponents. The Desert Storm operation illus-
trates the potential for such escalation. The coalition forces dominated the
skies, and as a result, air power could have been used to target enemy leaders.
Since Iraq could not similarly attack coalition leaders, it could have, for
instance, reacted by employing chemical munitions. A clear attempt to kill
Saddam Hussein might very well have inspired the use of chemical arms.
5) Targeted individuals aware of their fate may become irrational and
intransigent. They may become distrustful of those around them, develop
particular hatred for the enemy, or simply begin thinking irrationally. From
both a military and political perspective, this is a dangerous situation. Military
planning is based on calculations of cause and effect. When an adversary's next
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movebecomes unpredictable, coherentplanning becomes impossible. Addition-
ally, individual targeting might complicate negotiations for an end to hostilities.
In particular, an individual who knows that he is targeted may adopt a fight-to-
the-end mentality, believing that (assuming he survives) he will lose his
position when hostilities cease.
6) Targeted individuals are likely to be replaced by less acceptable alter-
natives. It may also be that no one is prepared to replace him. In this case,
the power vacuum created by the death of the target may prove dangerously
destabilizing.
7) The killing of an individual with civil as well as military responsibilities
may undercut the defeated state's ability to rely upon its own resources after
hostilities cease. In most conflicts, the victor does not seek to destroy totally
his opponent's governmental and social infrastructure, since the occupying
force would then become responsible under international law for providing
necessities to the defeated population and maintaining order. This responsibility
represents an enormous financial and logistical burden. Additionally, the longer
the occupation and the greater the scope of responsibility of the occupying
force, the more likely political costs are to mount. For example, as Israel has
learned in the occupied territories, maintaining a semblance of order provides
one's political enemies with much material for criticism.
8) Though the killing may be legal, many states may criticize the action
as immoral. Individual killings may ultimately save lives, but a state's political
foes surely would reject this rationalization. Indeed, the discussion of humani-
tarian intervention aptly demonstrates that even when the very survival of a
people is at stake, reasonable thinkers still argue against interventionist military
operations. Furthermore, since assassination is so misunderstood legally,
allegations that the state committing an individual killing has acted illegally
seem inevitable; and legal replies may engender cynicism or condemnation.
Potential political fallout may make the operation undesirable.
9) Policymakers must carefully consider their ultimate goal. Terrorism
provides an apt illustration. Terrorist acts pose a threat to the victim state, and
a forceful reaction makes sense. Although military operations may redress the
immediate harm and create disincentives for other terrorists, the use of force
against terrorists may isolate the nation employing it, as the Israeli experience
demonstrates. Today, anti-Israeli terrorists can find safe haven in numerous
countries, and state sponsorship of organizations engaged in terrorism against
Israel is widespread. Furthermore, forceful anti-terrorist actions may engender
more terrorist groups. This is not to say the a state should allow itself to suffer
repeatedly at the hands of terrorists; it should not. However, before acting,
policymakers must carefully consider the long-term ramifications of their
decisions. To win the battle but lose the war is senseless.
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B. The Prohibitions Evaluated
Ultimately the question is whether the prohibitions on assassination in
international and domestic law serve a useful purpose. In a sense they do. By
focusing attention on a particularly act, they may make recurrence of that act
less likely. The U.S. experience, unfortunately, demonstrates the depths to
which activities in support of foreign policy can sink. We now realize that in
the decades preceding the Church Committee investigations, the United States
conspired to commit acts that violated international law. The problem, accord-
ing to the Church Committee, arose from the lack of clarity of boundaries
circumscribing such activities. 97 To the extent that the bans diminish that
uncertainty, they serve a positive function. On the other hand, the imprecision
of the prohibitions and their lack of comprehensiveness have resulted in
confusion. Outside the law of armed conflict, for instance, no universal
prescription outlaws assassination. The one document that addresses the topic,
the New York Convention, is limited in scope, and it fails even to mention the
word assassination. Indeed, it relies on domestic law to criminalize the act.
1. The Shortcomings of the Current Prohibitions
Despite the absence of clear-cut guides, the understanding of assassination
under international law does require certain generally accepted elements. Most
importantly, assassination is viewed as having a political component. Unfortu-
nately, the criteria for ascertaining the political character of an act are ambigu-
ous. Consequently, killings committed by opponents are likely to be labeled
assassination; those committed by oneself or by allies are not. This situation
is unacceptable. The status of assassination in the law of armed conflict is only
marginally better. Commentators frequently confuse it with the norms govern-
ing lawful targets, though those are separate prescriptions. Legal analysis of
military operations suffers accordingly. Furthermore, the prohibition arguably
serves no purpose, since it is primarily understood as a variant of perfidy, a
practice separately proscribed in the conduct of hostilities. It is hard to imagine
any situation amounting to assassination that would not also violate the ban on
perfidy or be prohibited as the targeting of protected individuals.
An independent prohibition on assassination might make sense if the law
of armed conflict prescribed penalties for violations. For example, it is useful
in domestic law to distinguish between assault and aggravated assault because
the state is able to impose greater punishment for the latter offense. But the
law of armed conflict is not analogously structured; it sets forth no penalties
at all. Thus, to differentiate between an act of perfidy and a treacherous killing
297. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 191, at 265-79.
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is, given the general tendency to treat treachery and perfidy as equivalents,
to engage in legalistic semantics.
Possibly the worst state of affairs surrounds the domestic executive order
outlawing assassination. Setting forth a prohibition without clearly delineating
what it means is arguably more damaging than having no order at all. Not only
does the absence of definitional guidelines render the order subject to abuse
through exceedingly narrow interpretation, but (as in the Giroldi coup) it has
the potential to inhibit valid operations out of fear that the ban might be
violated.
The failure of the executive order to outline exactly what it prohibits has
set planners and operators adrift. The Justice Department and Army attempts
to clarify its scope in recent years provide ample illustration of this problem.
Those attempts have been relatively unsuccessful. The Justice Department
memorandum, for instance, remains classified. Possibly this has been done to
keep the opposition guessing and thereby serves a deterrent function. Yet the
best deterrent would be to place those who would commit acts of violence
against the United States clearly on notice as to what the costs of their actions
will be. Additionally, the memorandum does nothing to address adequately the
domestic and international controversy of any operation that might be labeled
assassination. Claims that the mission in question does or does not violate the
executive order tend to follow in lockstep fashion. The Army memorandum
also produced much confusion, at least within the press. If the United States
follows a policy of not engaging in assassination, it should set out that policy
clearly and publicly. The mere fact that interpretations were deemed necessary
at all illustrates the extent of the order's vagueness. Given these problems, the
best remedy is promulgation of an international convention specifically outlaw-
ing assassination. The tentative parameters of such an agreement can be
determined by examining the issues raised by current prohibitions.
2. A Proposed International Convention
The first priority is to determine exactly when the provisions of the pro-
posed convention would become operative. As noted above, it is often difficult
to determine when hostilities are "international" and whether they rise to the
level of "armed conflict." Despite this uncertainty, any international agreement
on assassination must mesh with the existing law of armed conflict. According-
ly, the current distinctions between international and non-international conflict
and between armed conflict and internal disturbances should be maintained.
With regard to international character, an assassination convention should
specifically exclude non-international conflicts from its coverage. These affairs
are best left to domestic law, since they do not involve the international
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community in any fundamental way. Domestic law enforcement is not the
problem; the problem is inappropriate means of settling international disputes.
At the same time, the convention should not address situations amounting
to armed conflict under international law. Such prescriptions are more appro-
priately placed within the law of armed conflict. Similarly, to avoid any
confusion, the agreement should explicitly disclaim any intent to limit uses of
deadly force that would otherwise be legitimate under international law. Self-
defense would, therefore, be automatically excluded.
In addition to determining when the prohibition is in effect, a workable
legal prescription must imbue it with definitional substance. Any prohibition
should be based on political motivation. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascer-
tain exactly where the boundaries of that term lie. The New York Convention,
which explicitly lists those whose killing would amount to assassination,
embodies the best approach. Targeting these individuals would be irrebuttably
presumed to be politically motivated. Of course, the restriction would not be
absolute. When the targeting of such persons would be otherwise permissible
under international law, they would remain legitimate objects of attack. Unlike
the New York Convention, the convention should not limit its application to
either those enumerated officials currently outside their state or those who
enjoy diplomatic status. The relevant inquiry is whether, not where, assassina-
tion has taken place. To impose geographical limits on the offense is to weaken
its overall prescriptive and deterrent effect.
Most importantly, the convention should specifically be self-executing,
making the act criminal under international law. Indeed, it would not be
unreasonable, in light of the proposed limitations set forth above, to character-
ize the prohibition as a codification of international customary law. Doing so,
assuming that the assertion is widely accepted, will automatically incorporate
the ban on assassination into the domestic law of many states-including, in
some cases, even those states that do not become signatories.
The convention should require states ratifying it to pass domestic imple-
menting legislation. Such legislation will not only strengthen the international
acceptability of the ban, but it will also make arguments that it represents
customary law more plausible. To enhance its impact, broad extradition
provisions should also be included, as should an attentat clause making it clear
that the political offense exception does not apply.
A number of questions are likely to arise concerning these proposals. In
the first place, critics might argue that the exclusion of legitimate uses of
deadly force from an assassination convention renders the agreement superflu-
ous, for the acts forbidden therein would already be illegal under international
law. This criticism is accurate, but not convincing. If assassination is consid-
ered to be a particularly heinous offense, then the community of nations should
emphasize its impermissibility by specifically proscribing it. Although it will
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not make an otherwise legal act illegal, expressly setting forth the prohibition
would perform both an informative and a deterrent function. This practice is
consistent with other prescriptions under international law. For example, using
chemical munitions in an attack on a state with which the actor is at peace
would constitute an unlawful resort to force. At the same time, the use of
chemical weapons would also be a separate violation of international law. 8
The fact that an act violates more than one legal prescription does not always
mean that multiple prohibitions are not beneficial.
Critics might additionally assert that the proposed convention inherits the
very uncertainty regarding "armed conflict" that this article criticized earlier.
Yet if the ban on assassination is to fit logically between domestic law and the
law of armed conflict, then it must adopt their characterization of the nature
of conflict. The exclusion of legitimate uses of deadly force resolves this
problem in part. Therefore, in the most likely scenario involving specific
targeting where "armed conflict" is uncertain-anti-terrorist operations-the
self-defense exception in the convention would keep the victim state's options
open.
A particularly fervent allegation likely to be voiced is that by so narrowly
limiting those individuals whose death will amount to assassination, the agree-
ment forfeits much of its potential effect. Though this criticism is essentially
correct, the scope of protected status has been circumscribed in an effort to
provide a means of objectively evaluating whether an act is political or not.
Obviously, some clearly political killings would not fall within the ambit of
the ban simply because the target does not occupy one of the enumerated
positions. That is unfortunate. However, a narrowly drafted prohibition that
clearly applies to specific actions serves the interests of enforcement better than
a broadly drafted ban subject to manipulation. Furthermore, any politically
motivated killing outside the terms of the convention would almost certainly,
at least in the case of state sponsorship, be prohibited under international law
as a wrongful use of force.
Should such a convention come into effect, the current executive ban
should be rescinded. While the ban serves the useful function of restraining
inappropriate operations, it also has sown great confusion. If the United States
were party to an international agreement, the executive order would serve no
purpose. It could be discarded without inviting damaging domestic and interna-
tional criticism that the United States was legitimizing assassination. However,
since no effort is underway to draft a convention like that proposed, however,
any such agreement is unlikely to be ratified in the near future. To this degree,
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the flaws inherent in the current executive order will continue to plague
coherent planning. Nevertheless, continuance of the executive order in its
present form is unacceptable. Even government agencies seem confused about
the boundaries of permissibility, and efforts to alleviate confusion by providing
authoritative interpretations have been demonstrably ineffective. The uncertain-
ty over its meaning has fostered the worst kind of public debates-those
occurring in the absence of agreement over the subject of the debate.
3. Alternative Solutions
a. Legislation
To resolve this disorder, two tacks are possible. Congress could pass
legislation along the lines of the proposed convention. This would be a wise
policy ifmost other states had comparable legislation, for a general internation-
al understanding of what such legislation was meant to encompass would
necessarily emerge. However, today only the United States has explicitly
banned the use of assassination as an instrument of foreign policy. Therefore,
interpretation will remain an issue of primarily domestic concern. Even though
the envisaged statute would be much clearer than the current order, it would
inevitably be subject to some degree of interpretation. In the case of a statute,
Congress, and possibly the courts, would be the primary interpreter. With an
executive order, on the other hand, the Executii'e Branch has the ultimate
authority to render definitive interpretations. 9
The question then is one of determining which branch should have greater
control over application of the prohibition. This is a nagging question. Certain-
ly the CIA abuses of the past would argue for greater congressional control.
Nevertheless, in the long run it is probably the Executive Branch that should
have the final say in interpretation and implementation. By its very nature,
Congress is a highly politicized institution. In the field of national security,
politicization is usually counterproductive, especially when tactics, not overall
policy, are at issue. It is one thing for Congress to articulate the nation's broad
goals in foreign affairs. But the issue of specific targeting is a very small
component of the use of force. It should be for the Executive Branch, operat-
ing within the confines of international law, to determine when the tactic is
necessary.
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This is not to suggest that Congress should not play a role in determining
when targeting specific individuals is acceptable. Congressional oversight is
an appropriate and valuable component of the democratic process, and an
elaborate system of oversight has, in fact, come into being to safeguard against
Executive Branch abuses. It is in this capacity that Congress should involve
itself with issues concerning assassination.
b. A More Precise Executive Order
Given the inappropriateness of leaving matters of tactics to Congress, the
best approach is to rescind the current executive order and issue a new, more
comprehensive one that precisely delineates the boundaries of permissibility.
In particular, the ban should not be buried, as the present one is, within the
broader United States Intelligence Activities Order. The topic is sensitive
enough to merit separate attention.
The contents of the proposed order would be analogous to those recom-
mended above with regard to the hypothetical assassination convention.
Basically, the order would apply only to international operations that fall short
of armed conflict, be limited to targets occupying specified positions, and be
inapplicable in situations where the use of deadly force is otherwise authorized
under international law.
4. Assassination in the Law of Armed Conflict
Finally, reform proposals must address the issue of assassination in the law
of armed conflict. Currently, the prohibition serves no purpose, since an act
constituting assassination would be prohibited in any event by the norm against
the use of perfidy. The law governing who may be a lawful target serves as
an additional safeguard against over-zealous individual targeting. Mention of
assassination in the domestic manuals governing the law of armed conflict is,
therefore, superfluous and unnecessarily confusing. It creates the impression
that assassination is somehow qualitatively different from perfidy. It is not;
instead, it is only one example of that already prohibited act. Therefore, all
mention of assassination as a specific genre of act should be deleted in future
editions of the Air Force and Army law of armed conflict manuals, with
treacherous killing cited as merely an example of a tactic involving perfidy.
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the Hague Regulations speak of treacherous
killing, not assassination; only when that provision was incorporated into the
current manuals did the term assassination emerge.' °°
300. Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 23(b); AiR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 19, 8-6d; ARMY
MANUAL, supra note 19, art. 31.
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Does this recommendation run counter to the earlier assertion that explicit
prohibitions on assassination serve an educative and deterrent function? Not
when one recalls that in situations short of armed conflict, killing is the
exception rather than the rule. Because killing is an exceptional act, it is
critical to emphasize repeatedly the narrow permissibility of the use of force
to resolve international disputes. When individuals are not sensitized to the
prescriptions, the prescriptions should be brought to their attention. Since
individual peacetime killing is seldom used, decisions to employ the technique
are made at the highest levels of government with the benefit of quality advice
from experts. This mitigates the risk of misinterpretation, particularly if the
proposed format were adopted. The problem with the current ban is not that
it overwhelms policy makers, but rather that it simply provides little guidance
as to what it encompasses. On the other hand, war is about killing, in which
simplicity is an invaluable virtue. Complex sets of norms governing the
conduct of hostilities will inevitably lead to poor decisions with disastrous
consequences. The prohibition on assassination in the manuals is a classic
example of this problem.
Even without considering the current assassination prescriptions, determin-
ing whether an individual can be targeted is basically a two-step process. First,
a planner must ascertain whether the individual is a lawful target. Then the
planner must determine whether the means selected to execute the mission
violate any specific prohibition. Since an act permissible under these two tests
will never be assassination, an assassination analysis would only complicate
matters.
C. Final Thoughts
This article has attempted to identify the parameters of both international
and domestic law regarding assassination as an instrument of state policy.
Analysis reveals that the various prescriptions are imprecise, confusing, and
occasionally counter-productive. Much remains to be done before we can be
assured that the prohibitions on assassination serve as effective guides to
permissible actions.
It is essential to focus constantly on the ultimate goals sought by interna-
tional law. Two of them are central: minimum and optimum world order
identified by the New Haven school of international law.30 Minimum world
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order implies the search for a world community that does not resort to coercion
and violence. Failing that, international law should at least serve as an effective
restraint on their wrongful use. Optimum world order involves the complemen-
tary goal of shaping and sharing values. These values include respect, power,
enlightenment, well-being, wealth, skill, affection, and rectitude. In other
words, international law should serve man's hierarchy of needs, from survival
to self-actualization.
It is only after evaluating specific targeting in terms of world order that
the decision to go forward can be made. True, the killing must be legal as
understood in the existing operational code. Obviously, it must also be both
practical and well-advised. Yet if the operation increases the likelihood of
coercion or violence or results in a net loss of values for the world community,
then it must be rejected. At the same time, when a killing comports with the
operational code, is reasonable from the practical perspective, and fosters
world order in a significant way, then policymakers have a moral responsibility
to consider it.
These are difficult decisions, albeit more easily made while hostilities are
ongoing. They involve a balancing of costs-the cost of a life against the
benefits of ending that life. Although it is hard to justify not targeting one
culpable individual to save many innocent lives, the decision becomes more
complex when long-term effects are considered. Hopefully, policy makers will
make decisions concerning the killing of human beings with the propriety that
world order demands.
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